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This thesis extends the development of the Advanced Airland Research Model
(ALARM), a research effort at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), in the areas of
urban terrain representation and urban mission planning. The growing proportion of
dismounted infantry forces in the U.S. Army and the increased urbanization of Europe
requires having a means at hand for studying the use of dismounted infantry in urban
combat. The feasibility of using networks to model urban terrain and sequence the
activities comprising an urban mission are demonstrated. A division scenario is
developed that links brigade and battalion terrain networks. A template for an urban
defense mission is developed and demonstrates the use of networks for simulating
mission planning in built-up areas. An outline is provided for linking multi-level terrain
and mission networks into one planning model.
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I. COMBAT IN BUILT-UP AREAS
A. INTRODUCTION
When one views history and considers the make-up of today's Army within the
context of Airland Battle Doctrine, urban combat is an aspect of future wars that
increases in importance. Much of the study done in the last ten years has been at the
tactical level where the nature of combat in cities sharply contrasts the fluid combat of
mechanized/armored forces. In retrospect, battles have often been fought in urban
areas because of their political, industrial and symbolic value or because they
unavoidably became the focus of a battle or campaign. This implies that urban
combat can have a strategic significance. The contrast in combat characteristics and
the strategic importance accorded many urban areas underscores a need to understand
urban combat, particularly from an operational context where strategic planning
translates to tactical execution of missions.
History is repleat with examples of ground forces fighting in built-up areas.
Examples are not limited to the battles of WWII, but find prominence over a wide
range of scenarios in Korea, Vietnam, and the iMideast as well as the Falklands,
Afganistan and Central America. Both U.S. and Soviet doctrines concerning combat in
built-up areas stress avoiding urban areas unless necessary. The conditions that
necessitate combat in built-up areas are important to operational planning. If anything,
the increased urbanization of Europe since WWII indicates a high probability of urban
combat occuring in a future European war. A brigade commander can expect to have
at least one urban area within his sector that controls key terrain or impacts on the
battle plan in some way.
The structure of today's Army and the realization that the next war in Europe
will fmd U.S. forces outnumbered necessitates a well defined role for dismounted
infantry. With the inception of the light division (and including airmobile and airborne
units), non-mechanized divisions now comprise a substantial part of the active Army.
Considering the quantitative superiority allowed the Soviet ground forces, this
represents a considerable portion of our combat capability that must be factored into
any conflict. Dismounted infantry is best suited for fighting in built-up areas. The
Army's Airland Battle Doctrine states that operational planning orients on decisive
objectives stressing the need to fight on terms favorable to us. The tenants of initiative,
agility, depth and synchronization combine with this idea to form the framework of the
doctrine. By successfully defending against the enemy's first echelon attacks, while
simultaneously disrupting the efforts of his follow-on forces and those elements which
sustain his effort, U.S. forces will project flexible combat power and maintain the
initiative necessary to defeat the enemy in detail at the time and place of our choosing.
Accomplishing these tasks implies maximizing the potential of U.S. combat assets. For
example, by capitalizing on man-made and natural obstacles and using dismounted
forces in depth and on restrictive terrain, mobile forces will be free to pursue the deep
battle [Ref. 1].
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
This thesis provides a methodology, from an operational planning perspective, for
modeling urban combat within the conceptual design of the ALARM (Airland
Advanced Research Model) model. ALARM has undergone a conceptual design
process at the NPS since 1984. The purpose is to develop a systemic, variable
resolution model combining the realism advantages of high resolution, interactive
models with the sensitivity and alternatives analysis capabilities usually inherent in
closed, aggregate models. ALARM uses three methodologies: time-domain networks,
cartesian-space networks, and a generalized value system. These methodologies
structure the planning and execution processes of the model. The cartesian-space and
time-domain networks are particularly suited for modelling the physical representation
of urban terrain and the planning functions of urban combat, respectively. Several
theses have demonstrated their applicability in modelling mechanized/armored combat
scenarios. The methodologies have been applied in the development of a network
solver that determines the critical path through a planning network [Ref. 2].
Additionally, a terrain network analysis model is being developed simultaneously with
this thesis. The model calculates avenue of approach physical characteristics [Ref. 3],
Another thesis previously developed using ALARM methodologies provides algorithms
for generating avenues of approach and allocating forces to these avenues in a terrain
network [Ref. 4]. Each of these models focuses on a single level of resolution.
However, the ALARM concept envisions modelling these processes at different levels
of resolution in order to depict multi-echelon views of the same system and to
assimilate varied attributes at each level. Thus, variable level resolution networks of
urban terrain can be created to support variable level planning and decision processes.
In general, once an activity level is established within the planning process (a mission is
received) and a picture of the battlefield and opposing forces is determined, the primary
planning task, allocates forces to meet mission goals. This allocation leads to a decision
process of assigning assets to targets. In turn, carrying out the allocation is the
planning task of the next subordinate unit. This thesis researches the representation of
variable resolution urban terrain through cartesian-space networks and the applicability
of time-domain networks to modeling urban warfare mission planning. The objectives
of the research are as follows:
• Demonstrate the applicability of established ALARM methodologies to
modeling urban combat.
• Refine the existing mathematical inputs to the Force Planning
Model to characterize combat in built-up areas.
• Demonstrate the capability of linking planning levels and their
respective missions through the use of time-domain networks and
cartesian-space networks.
C. DOCTRINE
In the preceding section the ALARM model was viewed in concept and
considered briefly as a means for modelling combat in built-up areas. The next step is
characterizing urban combat itself. This section begins, by way of background, with a
comparative discussion of U.S. and Soviet urban doctrine. With these ideas, missions
are developed for light/dismounted infantry. In the last section, a scenario is illustrated
for use in subsequent chapters demonstrating the design aspects of ALARM.
The special significance accorded battle in an urban setting is recognized by both
sides and, in general, the same doctrinal approach is taken. Towns and villages straddle
lines of communication and many cities in Europe are communications centers. Built
up areas pose as obstacles to maneuver and, in particular, impede or inhibit mobility,
speed of execution, and momentum. Both U.S. and Soviet doctrines stress avoiding
built-up areas and emphasize bypassing and isolating them when possible. However,
while both doctrines recognize the defensive value of urban areas, U.S doctrine
specifies including urban areas into defenses when possible. Built up areas have
inherent abilities for delaying, altering or stopping an attacker. They enhance weapons
effectiveness from a defensive perspective. The dominant role of mechanized and
armored forces in open terrain gives way to the use of light or dismounted infantry,
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supported by other arms, in an urban environment. Such a situation requires a change
in operational practices.
1. Soviet Defense
Generally, the Soviets emphasize defense as an economy of force operation in
an overall offensively oriented doctrine. A defense is established when regrouping
forces becomes necessary to continue offensive operations. The defense is used to
protect LOCs (lines of communication), rear areas, or flanks. Doctrine specifies
establishing a defense well forward of built-up areas and echeloning forces in depth.
Typically, a security zone is established out to 40 km and allocated to a second echelon
motorized rifle regiment. The purpose of this zone is delaying, deceiving, and disrupting
an attacker. The main defensive positions begin 15 km out from the built-up area and
is organized in two echelons. The first echelon of a division defense may consist of up
to two motorized rifle regiments heavily reinforced, particularly with artillery, and
organized in strong points around kill zones. The first echelon's mission is defeating an
attack forward of the built-up area. The second defensive echelon organizes along the
forward edges or approaches to the urban area and includes the first echelon regiments'
supplemental positions. These positions are prepared, in part, by the the first echelon
regiments themselves. The remainder of the preparation is done by the second echelon
regiment upon its withdrawal from the security zone and into the built-up area itself.
The tank regiment is used along flanks and areas where maneuver exists. A
characteristic of Soviet urban combat is combining arms down to platoon level.
Consequently, strong points will contain their own armor, anti-armor, artillery (in a
direct fire mode), as well as logistics elements. These salient features of a Soviet defense
of a built-up area are visible at levels above and below the motorized rifle division.
The technique lends itself to a rapid assumption of the offense. [Ref. 5]
2. Soviet Attack
Soviet oTfensive doctrine concerning built-up areas parallels U.S. doctrine. A
surprise attack from the march, the preferred tactic, is analogous to the hasty attack
used by U.S. forces. However, reconnaissance forces assume a critical role in both the
attack from the march (surprise attack) and the Soviet deliberate attack. The goal of a
surprise attack against a built-up area is to pursue key LOCs or terrain, such as
networks of highways, railheads, bridges and utilities. Reconnaissance elements
frequently work outside the range of artillery but can be expected to have close air
support, airborne and airmobile assets. Failure of a surprise attack may lead to a
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deliberate attack. In this situation, reconnaissance forces are responsible for seizing a
foothold in the built-up area. The phases of the Soviet deliberate attack on an urban
objective are isolation, reconnaissance, firing a preassault artillery prep, and assaulting.
Isolating the built-up area is the mission assigned to second echelon motorized rifle
regiments which do so by attacking to the flanks and rear of the objective. All attacks
emphasize mounted, rapid movement versus systematic clearing of the urban area. If
necessary, a massive preassault artillery barrage presages an assault on the built-up
area. The assault occurs through a foothold gained by reconnaissance elements. Again,
the key characteristic of this phase of operations is the Soviet propensity for combining
arms - often down to platoon level where task organization with tanks and artillery is
the norm. The mounted infantry attack is not necessarily abandoned in favor of
dismounted infantry assaults. The reason is the importance of the APC (armored
personnel carrier) to Soviet combined arms and the emphasis on rapid advance. Their
doctrine stresses conducting limited visibility operations. [Ref. 5: pp. 3-1 to 3-12]
3. U.S. Defense
It is not surprising that a relative wealth of material is available on U.S.
defensive doctrine. The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) posture in
Western Europe makes it the most likely situation to occur at the outset of war. Use of
urban terrain as a combat multiplier is a key aspect of this defense. Consistent with
defensive doctrine in general, the role of urban areas is defined in terms of the covering
force, main battle area, and rear area operations. The restrictive nature of built up
areas assists in the hand-off within the covering force area by denying the enemy the
ability to gather maneuver room and momentum. The presence of an urban area may
assist in accomplishing the covering force mission of deceiving, delaying and attriting
the enemy. Frequently, the main battle area will consist of mutually supporting urban
areas around which the defense is organized. Defensive positions are situated well
forward of critical built-up areas and may incorporate other built-up areas that are
astride or dominate avenues of approach and whose retention is not necessary to the
overall plan. Mechanized and armored forces prevent isolation of defended built-up
areas by maximizing long range fires, channelizing the enemy, and forcing him to
deploy early. In locations where maneuver is restricted, a deliberate defense by
infantry or dismounted forces in cooperation with mobile forces is established on the
periphery of built-up terrain integrating adjacent key terrain. The assumption is that
either the urban terrain has key terrain within it or adjacent to it, or that the enemy
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will attempt to bypass it. Rear area operations often center around urban terrain. As
such, they may require protection or defense from Soviet airmobile and airborne
strikes. In these situations, the defense will take place within the built-up area itself
from the outset. U.S. doctrine emphasizes task organizing combined arms down to
company level but recognizes the dominance of infantry elements in conducting the
defense. [Ref. 5: pp. 3-13 to 3-19]
4. U.S Attack
U.S. attacks in and around built-up areas are categorized in standard doctrinal
terms: hasty and deliberate. A hasty attack against an urban objective differs from a
deliberate attack in that the attacking force most likely will be required to move
through a fixing force versus moving around it on a flank. This requirement exists for
two reasons. First, the urban objective is an obstacle to maneuver in and of itself.
Second, the attack is only undertaken if a maneuver to bypass is not possible or fails in
the first place. Loss of the element of surprise, stiff opposition against a hasty attack,
insufficient forces, and a congested battle area are causes for conducting a deliberate
attack against a built-up area. The three phases of an attack against an urban area are
isolating, assaulting, and clearing. Isolating is usually carried out on adjacent natural
and/or key terrain by armored and mechanized forces. Here suppressive fires (air and
ground) and ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles) are used to their fullest extent since,
their effects are diminished inside a built-up area. Assault forces are balanced,
combined arms units representative of the major organization conducting the attack.
The shock action, mobility
,
and firepower of these forces are ideal for seizing a
foothold on the outskirts of the urban objective and for conducting feints or
supporting attacks to alternate flanks and rear. Once in the built-up area, light
infantry, dismounted infantry and engineers become the dominant forces used in
clearing. In this phase, armored forces perform direct support and mobile reserve roles-.
Consequently, task organizing for an attack on an urban objective necessarily includes
attachment of dismounted infantry. [Ref. 5: pp. 2-7 to 2-15]
D. URBAN PATTERNS AND MISSIONS
A method of categorizing missions in and around urban areas is to analyze task
organizations in relation to urban patterns. While not exhaustive, this section
illustrates several of the most probable missions and structures them along the lines of
urban patterns. In regards to ALARM, emphasis focuses on the planning level(s)
germane to the mission. A brief discussion of some relevant facts on Western European
urbanization provides a framework of reference.
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Since the end of WWII a significant increase in urbanization has occured in
Western Europe and the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) in particular.
Urbanization is defined in four categories. Large cities contain populations in excess of
100,000 and form the center of densely built-up urban complexes. It is estimated that
the roughly forty-nine large cities in the FRG account for ten percent of the land area.
A corps commander can expect to have at least one large city in his sector. Towns and
small cities, often found near large cities and along LOCs, have populations between
3,000 - 100,000. It is estimated that there are over 230 such areas. One or more
divisions may simultaneously be concerned with this type of built-up area. Villages
number in excess of 20,000 and contain populations under 3,000. The typical brigade
sector may have an average of twenty five villages with an average interval of 3.5 km
between them. Strip areas occur within 'most urban patterns. They are relatively small
built-up areas occuring next to secondary roads and along LOCs. Strip areas are
primarily the concern of battalions and below but, those in the vicinity of larger cities
will naturally concern higher commands. Within any of these categories, the density
and types of man-made features can be homogeneous or heterogeneous but, in general,
the larger the area the more variable the densities and structure types. [Ref. 5: p. 1-2]
Patterns of urbanization are natural delimiting mechanisms for defining and task
organizing missions. There are five of these patterns. They result from the combination
of natural terrain features with the four categories of built-up areas. Each is described
in FM 100-5 [Ref. 5: pp. 1-2 to 1-8] and briefly summarized below.
1. Hub
A hub is the central complex of any urban pattern. Regardless of its size, its
effect remains constant relative to defensive and offensive missions. For the defender,
the hub serves as an anchor point of the defense or a strong point for a defense in
depth if adjacent terrain restricts maneuver. An attacker first attempts to bypass a hub.
If not successful, it becomes a pivotal point he must overcome at considerable expense
in terms of time and resources. On occasion a hub may be the objective of a deliberate
attack for purely strategic reasons and the focus of corps level planning . [Ref. 5: p.
1-6]
2. Satellite
The primary aspect of the satellite pattern which distinguishes it from a hub is
the mutual support of its components. Generally, satellites ring hub areas. Mutual
support applies to economic, transportation and communication aspects as well as
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tactical, lines of communication, and weapons efTects aspects. Satellite patterns receive
particular attention in division and brigade planning sectors. They are further
characterized as having homogeneous terrain and a primary LOC passing through the
hub. Numerous routes for attacker and defender are available. [Ref. 5: p. 1-7]
Figure 1.1 Hub and Satellite Patterns.
3. Network
The network pattern is larger than the satellite pattern, has less homogeneous
terrain, and provides less mutual support between built-up areas. Most often it is
composed of several satellite patterns or hub areas and appears less symmetric.
Primarily the concern of divisions and corps, the network will contain numerous critical
and divergent lines of communication. It is ideally suited to a defense in depth but
provides an attacker with the most flexible and numerous maneuver options.
[Ref. 5: p.-1-7]
4. Linear
This pattern is prevalent in the other patterns but, because of its relatively
small size, does not effect planning above the battalion level. Frequently, a linear built-
up area incorporates a key terrain feature such as a bridge, railhead, or power plant.
For a defender it facilitates the networking of defensive positions and provides natural
obstacles for channelizing an attacker. For these reasons it presents an attacker with a
15
series of decisions that effect his task organization, avenue of approach and timing.
[Rcf. 5: p. 1-8]
Segment
Linear
Figure 1.2 Network, Linear, and Segment Patterns.
5. Segment
All levels of command are confronted with this pattern. It occurs where an
urban area is significantly divided by natural terrain features such as ridges, rivers, or
elevated multi-lane highways. It impacts especially on boundary determination and
task organization and can be to the benefit or detriment of the attacker and defender.
[Ref. 5: p. 1-8J
A synthesis of these pattern characteristics leads to light infantry being task
organized with armored and mechanized forces in the following situations:
• On restrictive urban terrain to maximize its use as an obstacle.
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• To make an initial penetration in a built-up area.
• To seize and clear an entire built-up area.
• To control locations where LOCs pass through built-up areas.
• For controlling urban networks for use by mobile forces.
These are situations where urban terrain is to be held, systematically seized and
cleared, or the mission can be enhanced by using airmobile units. A listing of light
infantry missions, according to planning level, incorporates the ideas presented in this
section and is shown at Table 1.
TABLE 1
MISSION LISTING BY PLANNING LEVEL
HUB SATELLITE NETWORK LINEAR SEGMENT
CORPS
Deliberate Def. Def. in Depth Deliberate Def.
Deliberate Atk. Airmobile Delay Airmobile Delay
Rear Defense Deliberate Atk.
Defense of LOC
Deliberate Atk.
DIV Deliberate Def. Defense in Depth Deliberate Def.
Deliberate Atk. Defense of LOC Deliberate Atk.
Defense of LOC Deliberate Atk. Airmobile Delay
Airmobile Delay Airmobile Delay
BDE Defense in Depth Deliberate Def,
Deliberate Atk. Deliberate Atk.
Airmobile Delay Airmobile Delay
Deliberate Def.
BN Hasty Atk. Hasty Atk.
Deliberate Atk. Deliberate Atk.
- Deliberate Def. Deliberate Def.
Recon Airmobile Delay
Recon
CO/PLT Hasty Atk. Hasty Atk.








The Fulda Gap is a traditional axis of attack into the south-central part of
Western Europe. Assuming that an attack by the Warsaw Pact seeks use of some
portion of this axis, the general scenario places a Blue light infantry division defending
to the north of the gap against a flank attack whereby Red attempts to avoid Blue's
strength forward and within the gap. The division sector is an urban network. In
addition to the six small cities and towns and the fourteen villages, the terrain is
characterized by two river obstacles, the Eitra and the Haune. Heavily wooded, hilly
areas border on the north and south with elevations averaging 450 meters. The terrain
restricts high speed avenues of approach to two routes which orient on bridges across
the river obstacles. These crossing locations are controlled by built-up areas and if
seized by Red, allow for rapid flank access into the Fulda Gap. The pictorial at Figure
1.3 depicts the sector and approaches. The map representation is from Series M745
3-DMG-1975, 1:50,000 L5324, Hunfeld (NB4717-NB5817-NB5928-NB4728).
The blue division is organized in a defense in depth. Assume that the
ALARM model, at this level, determines an optimal force allocation suggesting a
infantry and mechanized task organization. Pure light brigades defend the northern and
southern flanks in terrain that is restrictive to mechanized forces. A mixed brigade is
responsible for the central sector. A mech-heavy brigade, in reserve, defends in depth
along the Haune which is the main river obstacle. According to the planning horizons
shown at Appendix A, the Blue division plans to face at least one Red division of a
Combined Arms Army.
2. Brigade Scenario
The center brigade is the focus at this level of resolution. For simplification,
the only units represented in the brigade are the infantry, mechanized, armor and
artillery elements. The brigade's sector is characterized as a satellite pattern with
Eiterfeld as the hub. The brigade executes a deliberate defense within its sector.
Implied missions for the brigade are a defense of the Eitra. and a defense of
Eiterfeld. The town is key terrain which blocks approach to open terrain to its
southwest and access to the bridges across the Haune. An attempt to bypass Eiterfeld
requires river crossings to the north or traversing dismounted to the south. The brigade
plans to defend against Red regiments of a MRD (motorized rifle division) and is task
organized as in Table 2.
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Figure 1.3 Division Sector.
TABLE 2
BRIGADE TASK ORGANIZATION
INF BN 1 TF LITE INF BN 3 BDE CON
3 Inf Co 3 Inf Co 3 Inf Co Mech Bn(-)
1 CSC 1 CSC 1 CSC Armor Co(-)
Arty Btry Mech Co Arty Btry Engr Bn
Armor Pit Mech Arty
Arty Btry DS Arty
3. Battalion Task Force Scenario
Task Force Lite, in the brigade center, defends Eiterfeld. The town's
proximity to Arzell and the Eitra characterize the task force sector as a segmented
pattern. The task force elements are located between 20 km and 50 km to the rear of
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Eiterfeld and must move to the sector. The mechanized company and the armor
platoon form the covering force and establish a security zone approximately 2 km
forward of the town. The task, organization is a light infantry battalion augmented with
mechanized and armored elements.
TABLE 3
BATTALION TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION
INF CO A INF CO B INF CO C TM MECH TFCON
3InfPLT 3InfPLT 3 Inf PLT 3 Mech PLT Btry D
1 Armor Pit AT Pit
Engr Pit
Eiterfeld is four square kilometers in size with a population over 3,000. It
consists of a light industrial section to the northwest, a business section in the center,
and a residential area to the southeast which thins into farms and strip areas to the
northeast. Four hard surface, all weather roads enter Eiterfeld from the north and exit
in two roads to the south and west crossing the Eitra. Three hill masses are key terrain
to the northeast: Hill 406, Hill 306, Hill 376, which dominate the northeastern portions
of Eiterfeld and its approaches. Hill 335 on the northern outskirts of the town and Hill
324 directly south control immediate bypass avenues to the bridge locations. Within
Eiterfeld, key terrain features are the factories in the industrial section, the reservoir
north of the town and the central business sector which controls all routes through the
town.
The remaining chapters, which develop an urban methodology, use the
battalion task force scenario. The center brigade scenario and its subordinate element's




Cartesian space networks are used in ALARM to model the physical aspects of
the battlefield. Normally the first step in planning an operation (following mission
analysis) is making a terrain assessment. How a section of terrain impacts on tactical
movement/unit placement, logistics and communications are generally things
considered by a planning organization. While ALARM will incorporate multi-level
cartesian space networks for each of these, the purpose of this chapter is to extend the
development of the terrain/transportation network to built-up areas. The scenario
presented in the first chapter is modeled" in the candidate networks. Previous work with
terrain networks is extended by identifying urban peculiar network characteristics and
attributes. An additional purpose of this chapter," pursuant to a conceptual objective
of ALARM, is to outline the integration of parallel subordinate networks within the
network of a higher planning organization. The presentation of the candidate
terrain/transportation networks emphasizes integration at the brigade and battalion
levels. The division and brigade networks are first described in terms of arc/node types
and attributes. Task Force Lite's sector includes Eiterfeld and forms a subordinate
network within the brigade terrain/transportation network. This brigade network is also
defined. A brigade subordinate unit mission paralleling the defense of Eiterfeld is
defending along the Eitre River north of Eiterfeld. Thus, the battalion defending this
sector has a river defense mission against a possible Soviet regimental crossing
operation. The corresponding battalion terrain/transportation forms another portion of
the brigade terrain/transportation network. A follow-on step in the ALARM design is
modelling the simultaneous brigade level planning and execution of these two battalion
level missions. This follow-on step is discussed further in the conclusions section of the
final chapter.
A. ARC TYPES AND ATTRIBUTES
An arc in a cartesian space network represents a homogeneous strip of terrain
between two points on the ground. The nodes delineate the end points of the particular
terrain possessing the homogeneous characteristic. At the levels of resolution used in
ALARM, homogeneous is defined in terms of the most prevalent type of terrain that
influences movement. As the level of resolution increases, the degree of homogeneity,
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represented by arc types, increases since the network becomes more detailed. For
terrain and transportation networks that depict built-up areas, the arc types and
attributes defined by previous research are still appropriate and are shown in Appendix
B. However, the proper modeling of urban areas requires additional arc type and
attribute descriptors, particularly for higher resolution networks.
The only urban simulation in use today by the U.S. Army is ACABUG
(American Canadian Australian British Urban Game). The model is high resolution
and defines urban characteristics in terms of densities. Additionally, ACABUG
categorizes attributes such as construction materials, building types, and percentage of
firing apertures, to name a few. Defining urban characteristics in terms of densities is
appropriate for this research. However, the list given in Appendix B need only be
augmented with seven additional arc types. The first five additional arc types are
defined in FM 100-5 [Ref. 5: pp. 1-4 to 1-5] and the last two originate with the author.
All are estimated in terms of ratios of built-up volume to total urban volume. Using
volume as the means of expressing these density types accounts for the three
dimensional aspect of fighting in an urban environment. The measurements given are
estimates from scaled photographic examples. A brief description with the number
code of each follows. [Ref. 6]
• Urban Dense Random (11) : Buildings are located close together in a random
arrangement. Older European cities and towns consist primarily of random dense
patterns. The roads are narrow with buildings and structures buttressing against them.
[Ref. 5: p. 1-4]
• Urban Orderly Block (12) : Typical of center sections of larger built-up areas,
this density classification is closed but organized, usually in a grid pattern. Streets are
wide, buildings are high and connected, with breaks occuring at intersections. Thus,
compartmenting occurs and reduces observation and fields of fire. [Ref. 5: p. 1-4]
• Urban Residential Dispersed (13) : This type of area surrounds or borders the
orderly block type. It is characterized by one to three story single dwellings with
patterned open spaces such as yards or gardens. The streets can form square blocks or
circular patterns. [Ref. 5: p. 1-5]
•Urban High-Rise (14) : A self descriptive characteristic is the height of buildings
in this type of area, frequently five to twenty stories tall. These areas are contiguous to
the orderly block type and exist most frequently in larger cities. It features large open
spaces between buildings. There are obvious advantages to the defender in terms of
observation and strength of positions. [Ref. 5: p. 1-5]
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• Urban Industrial/Transportation (15) : The industrial and transportation
pattern is usually part of large built-up area. It is characterized by moderate to large
buildings of varying constructoral strength with a lot of open space between structures.
Industrial areas usually include major transportation routes and railways. [Ref. 5: p.
1-5]
• Urban Open Space (16) : These are areas in or near built-up areas that offer
increased fields of fire but are still controlled by the surrounding urban structures.
Examples are parks, parking lots or sports fields.
• Sparse Urban/Terrain Combination (17) : Perhaps the most common type
density where combat is likely to occur, urban/terrain combinations are located on the
periphery of built-up areas. The major characteristic is that it includes key terrain
within or adjacent to the city or town. This type has a relatively low ratio of buildings
to area but the combination of key terrain and a few hardened structures makes
urban/terrain areas attractive to a defender and creates good foothold areas for an
attacker who can seize any portion of one.
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF ARC TYPES AND ATTRIBUTES
ARC TYPE ATTRIBUTES
Urban Dense Random (11) Density =40%
Urban Orderly Block (12) Density = 60%
Urban Residnt Disp (13) Density = 48%
Urban High-Rise (14) Density = 30%
Urban Indust/Trans (15) Density = 15%
Urban Open Space (16) Density = 0%
Sparse Urban/Terrain Comb. (17) Density = 10%
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B. NODE TYPES AND ATTRIBUTES
Several additional node types require defining and addition to the list at
Appendix B, further describing urban networks. The four node types described below
are prominent points within any urban pattern. They either delimit the density
patterns described above or are focal points in planning urban operations, especially
placing troops and control measures.
• Urban Intersection (6) : Intersections provide easily identifiable coordination
points and, when connected, can denote phase lines. Both of these control features are
important to urban combat planning and mission execution. Larger intersections can
control disproportionately large sections of built-up areas in all directions. They are
also key points in the lateral movement and shifting of forces.
• Key Building/Structure (7) : This node type is used to denote the beginning
and end of a particular avenue of approach. They may be placed anywhere within the
network but will typically mark changes in density type.
• Bridge End Node (8) : Bridges are usually key terrain, as in the present
scenario. Therefore, the end nodes mark a transportation arc that requires control,
traversal by a unit, or is otherwise critical to the plan.
• Urban Peripheral Opening (9) : Frequently within built-up areas open spaces
occur, as described earlier. In urban constricted areas, openings present better fields of
fire and observation as well as maneuver capability. As such, the nodes that mark the
peripheral points of this type of urban terrain are important to planning.
TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF NODE TYPES AND ATTRIBUTES
NODE TYPE ATTRIBUTES
Urban Intersection (6) No Additional
Key Building/ Structure (7)
Bridge End Node (8)
Urban Peripheral Opening (9)
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C. URBAN TERRAIN NETWORKS
Much of the research already conducted for ALARM has emphasized using
terrain/transportation networks in mission analysis and unit placement. The thesis by
McLaughlin [Ref. 4: pp. 20 to 91] presents algorithms that calculate network flow rates
and select arcs for positioning units. The flow rates indicate the allowable size and
speed of a unit traversing an arc. The rates can be used to model a scheme of
maneuver. From a defensive perspective, McLaughlin's work results in algorithms that
model a unit's ability to select terrain most favorable to its tactical plan in terms of
stopping or delaying an attacker. The arc selection process was improved upon from
earlier work to the degree that now allows the use of multiple selection criteria. For
example, fields of fire, cover and concealment criteria can all be used selecting a route
whereas, prior to Mclaughlin's work, only one of these could be used. In essence, this
allows the representation of differing tactical preferences. Additionally, and perhaps
most significantly, the methodology models a unit's ability to defend or orient its
combat power in several directions, which translates to exerting control over several
arcs. The capability to split a unit's combat power is important to realistically
representing combat in built-up areas where the ground battle typically takes on a
multi-directional character.
Inherent in a unit's planning process is analyzing terrain in order to arrive at
decisions about committing forces. The thesis research currently being done by Choi
develops a terrain network analysis model [Ref. 3]. In general, the model accepts
terrain data input represented by 100 m coded grid squares and calculates the length,
width, and slope of a terrain arc. Changes between terrain types corresponding to
those listed in Appendix B are measured in width along the arcs of a network.
Calculating the average width along the length of an arc produces a description of an
avenue of approach that can be related to flow rate. The model also determines the
average slope along an arc. While the current model uses 100 m squares to code the
terrain, it is fair to say that the resolution can easily be varied depending upon the
available data. It should be noted that the terrain data depicting the urban scenario is
available through Rolands and Associates, Monterey, Ca., in a corps sized section
[Ref. 7]. The data points are coded and correspond to the six-digit grid coordinates of
the map sheet referenced in the first chapter. Thus, sorting through the corps data, one
can extract the division, brigade, and battalion sectors for use in Choi's terrain model.
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As stated earlier, an objective of the continuing research in ALARM is to link
parallel missions, at one level of resolution, within higher command level planning
networks. Ultimately, the terrain analysis model and avenue of approach generation
and unit placement algorithms will be tied in with this work to produce a prototype
planning module for ALARM. A step in that direction, and one of the stated goals of
this thesis, is modeling the urban terrain networks at various levels of resolution. The
remainder of this chapter presents the candidate division, brigade and battalion
networks. The map section shown in Figure 2.1 is a reproduction of the battle area.
Subsequent figures depict the various level networks placed over this terrain.
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Figure 2.1 Divisional Battle Sector.
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1 . Division Network.
The division network shown in Figure 2.2 models the two avenues of
approach described in the first chapter. The arcs that support a mounted attack
against Eiterfeld are limited. However, Eiterfeld dominates all of the arcs depicted.
Urban nodes denote only the key points of interest within the built-up area such as
bridges or intersections. In the present scenario, the divisional points of interest are
the bridges and those urban features whose seizure by the enemy would necessitate a
change in the friendly course of action. For example, seizure of the central intersection
of Eiterfeld might render the retention of the remainder of the town untenable. The
lower resolution node type, village (2), denotes the smaller urban areas in entirety.
Figure 2.2 Division Network.
2. Brigade Network
Solid black nodes are nodes that are common with a higher command level
and are shown in order to demonstrate how the networks link. The linking nodes of
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the division network, are apparent in Figure 2.3. At this level of interest, only key
points and features are assigned a node. Note that a larger city may contain many key
urban nodes linked by their respective arcs. Eiterfeld is a relatively small town and thus
requires fewer arc/node combinations. The arcs depict only those paths through the
built-up area network that support enemy formations within the brigade's planning
horizon. The respective arcs from the division network are, in many instances,
segmented into subarcs in the brigade terrain/transportation network. This is because
the brigade has a more refined view of the battlefield and is naturally concerned with
specific areas for delaying and stoping the enemy.
^
Figure 2.3 Brigade Network.
3. Battalion Network
Figure 2.4 is an enlargement of the task force sector with the urban network
superimposed. At this level of resolution, all the key features of the built-up area that
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are of interest to the task force are depicted by nodes. The connecting arcs take on the
density attributes. The key bridges are marked by a pair of end nodes which allows
forces to be placed on the connecting arcs. Again, as in the brigade network, lower
resolution arcs become segmented into more detailed subarcs in the battalion network.
The resulting arcs are capable of supporting the movement of company sized enemy
elements at a minimum. Avenues of approach that would allow an enemy force to
bypass are also represented by arc/node combinations since it is assumed that the
enemy would focus on these paths in his planning. Thus, the terrain surrounding and
adjacent to Eiterfeld is important to the friendly plan as locations for preventing
isolation of the built-up area.
Figure 2.4 Task Force Sector.
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Terrain analysis is an aspect of ALARM that is being fully developed. The
networks depicted above, in combination with the defined arc and node types, present
the means to extend research into the multi-resolution design concept held by the
ALARM designers [Ref. 8]. In this respect, the urban terrain networks and the
terrain/transportation network utilized in the prototype Soviet river crossing mission
provide the foundation for linking parallel missions under a higher command planning
network. Leaving this as an area for future research, emphasis in the next chapter is
on urban time domain networks that will work in tandem with the urban cartesian
space networks.
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III. TIME DOMAIN NETWORKS
Time domain networks represent mission planning processes and are designed as
planning templates. Having completed a mission statement and terrain analysis, and
obtained estimates of friendly and enemy capabilities, the next step in the planning
process is to analyze friendly courses of action against the enemy's probable course of
action. The mission planning template, or network, serves this purpose in ALARM. It
is also the mechanism whereby orders to subordinate elements are formulated. In
analyzing courses of action, commanders and staffs recognize that certain factors are
under their control such as task organization, movement routes and artillery allocations
to name a few. Other factors cannot be controlled but still must be considered in the
analysis. For example, enemy actions, terrain characteristics and enemy capabilities are
factors that must be anticipated. The latter are considered from best case to worst
case when analyzing friendly courses of action. By analyzing all of the various
combinations of these controlled and uncontrolled factors, feasible options for
accomplishing -the mission result. The basis for determining feasibility is usually time,
friendly casualties and/or attrition to the enemy. From the feasible options the
commander selects the most favorable course of action for accomplishing the mission's
objective and then generate orders to subordinates.
The Force Planning Model in ALARM is designed to find the feasible paths
through a mission planning network. Whereas the model was initially built around a
Soviet regimental river crossing template, this chapter provides an urban template for
use in the model. The section which follows explains the structure of the Force
Planning Model using time domain network terminology, with particular emphasis
drawn to the relationships of the model's inputs with the actual planning process. With
this in mind, the mission template for a U.S urban defense is developed and explained
in detail. The central features of this type network are the mathematical submodels
that characterize the particular combat. These are developed for the urban defensive
scenario. The next chapter analyzes the results obtained using the urban defense
template in the Force Planning Model.
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A. THE FORCE PLANNING MODEL
The Force Planning Model solves time domain networks in the ALARM
planning process. The arcs of a time domain network, represent the passage of time, or
activities, and the nodes delineate the beginning and end of these time periods and are
called events. Solving the time domain network is analogous to solving a PERT
(Program Evaluation and Review Technique) network for the critical path. The criteria
for selecting the critical path in PERT is time. However, the critical path for the Force
Planning Model is defined in terms of minimizing the time for completing the mission
and friendly casualties but may also include a level of attrition to the enemy. Thus, the
resulting solution is structured by the time, casualty, and mission constraints imposed
by the next higher echelon. The solution also defines the mission orders of a lower
echelon.
As an illustration of these ideas, Figure 3.1 depicts the mission planning template
used for the Soviet regimental river crossing mission. While it is a regimental template,
the sequence of activities may be equally appropriate to any Soviet planning level. On
ACTIVITY
(1.2) ADVANCE GUARD MOVE TO ATTACK POSITION
(2.3) ADVANCE rUARD MOVE V2 CCTA.CT
(3.4) ADVANCE GUARD FIGHT COVERING FORCE
1 4,6) ADVANCE GUARD FIGHT DEFENDT?r- FORCE
(1.5) REGIMENT ARTY CROUP MOVE TO FIRING PSN
(5.6) REGIMENT APT.' GP.O'JP OCOfPY FIRING °03TTI0N
(6,3) REGIMENT ART' TOl/P FIFE °REP
(1.7) MAIN FORCE tttVE TO ATTACK POSITION
(7,3) main force occupy attack position
(3,0) maim furce move to contact
(3,1c) tain force defeat defending force
(1-,11) main force crosc river
(1,11) leceryc force move to objective
EXA'-'PLE SUnORDI!iATE UNIT ACTIVITY
(5,6) OCCUPY FIRING PSN
(5,a) Establish directional control 1
(a,b) IlstaMish directicnal control 2
(b,c). Establish dii>ectionaT control 3
Ca,d) P"l "'ires reristration
(d,6) Dili receives atnr.o resuoclv
(b,6) 3N2 i'eeei/es a,-mio resurply
(c,6) PN3 jTeceives ammo resupnly
Figure 3.1 Soviet Regt. River Crossing Template.
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the other hand, other templates may be necessary to categorize river crossings at other
command levels. Because of the inherent simplicity of having one template apply to all
levels and mission scenarios, designing a single generic template was a developmental
goal for the urban defense. But, first, a brief description of the model inputs is
necessary before further pursuing the network development.
1. Model Inputs
The time domain network is a generalized depiction of the sequence of events
a force must plan and conduct to successfully complete a mission. Events are
connected by activities, pictorially represented by arcs, and represent the passage of
time. Each activity is structured within five constraints. As they pertain to combat,
these constraints include a time to accomplish the activity, the makeup of the opposing
forces, and the attrition to the opposing forces. In the Force Planning Model, the
constraints are called arc characteristic equations. They may change in form, depending
on the mission being modeled, but do not change in substance. They are always
defined by a duration equation, friendly and enemy force makeup equations and
friendly and enemy survivor equations. Figure 3.2 gives a conceptual picture of the
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Figure 3.2 Model Inputs Defining an Activity.
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The idea of arc characteristics being allowed to change form but not substance
relates directly to the point made earlier of the existance of two types of planning
factors: those a commander/ staff can control and those that cannot be controlled.
These are referred to as changeable factors and immutable factors, respectively. Both are
input parameters to the Force Planning Model and are related through the
characteristic equations. These parameters define the form of the arc characteristics.
Since changeable factors are things that can be directly changed by a decision, they are
assigned a starting and ending value and an increment of change value. To illustrate,
in defending a built-up area with a combination of mechanized and light infantry
forces, a commander may consider including elements of both types in the composition
of the covering force. Thus, he would consider adding to or taking away from a
mechanized base in increments of light infantry squads, platoons, companys etc.,
depending on the activity level and situation. Immutable factors, on the other hand,
are those things that may be affected but not controlled by a decision. For example,
the commander planning the employment of the covering force in front of an urban
area can only anticipate how the enemy will organize his forces to counter the threat
his covering force presents. He thus plans against several alternatives that simplify to a
pessimistic, expected, and optimistic prediction of opposing force size. The model uses
a weighting system to combine these three estimates with the most weight usually given
to the expected value of the immutable factor to produce an enemy course of action.
Equation (3.1) gives the general form of the simple weighting function.
(a(Pessimistic) + b(Expected) + c(Optimistic))/ n = Value (eqn 3.1)
The values of the coefficients can be chosen to model any number of decision
situations. For example, if the extreme cases are the only contingencies of concern, the
value of b is set to zero. The value of n must be the sum of the coefficients. While
standard PERT methodology uses the values (1,4,1) for the coefficients, the current
Force Planning Model uses the Soviet planning technique of setting the weights equal
to (3,0,2).
2. Solving The Model
Central to the planning process is analysis of the courses of action. Assuming
that the inputs to the decision making process are reasonable or valid, the plan results
from comparing the alternatives and selecting the best option. Infeasible alternatives
are discarded. If all alternatives are infeasible, the commander in effect must look to
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changeable factors and determine levels that will allow the mission to be successfully
completed. The model simulates this analysis by comparing results given the
characteristic equation for each activity, or arc, on the network ( i.e., determining the
duration, force makeup, and force survivors of each activity at the various changeable
factor values).
Defining the changeable factor ranges allows the model to search for
combinations that yield feasible solutions. This is accomplished by moving through a
conceptual tree network of factor values. The vector of changeable factor starting
values is used to calculate the duration, makeup, and force survivors for each activity
with the combined, weighted value of the immutable factors. Violation of either the
overall mission completion time or maximum friendly casualty level results in an
infeasible course of action and causes the incrementing of one of the changeable
factors. The procedure continues until all possible combinations are checked. The
outcome with the shortest time and the minimum casualties to the friendly side is the
optimal solution. At this point, the usual by-products of a network solution are
generated such as the critical path arcs, slack times and sequence of critical events.
As an example, consider a company level urban activity in a planning network
of clearing a building. Suppose the course of action depends only on three factors: the
size of the enemy force, the size of the assault force and the amount of ammunition
required for the assault. The first factor is an immutable factor. Therefore assume that
the enemy is expected to occupy the objective in squad strength but at best may only
use a fire team and at worst a platoon. The size of the assault force and ammunition
load are changeable factors. Thus, analysis of the courses of action might start with a
platoon in the assault carrying twice the basic load of ammunition. However, other
possible courses of action require consideration of increasing the size of the assault
force in platoon increments and decreasing the ammunition carried by half loads. One
of the constraints on the mission could be as follows. First, a higher headquarters is
likely to impose a time limit for completion of the mission. The actual time needed is a
function of the opposing force size, the number of friendly troops sent into the assault,
and the amount of ammunition they require to clear the enemy. Likewise, the
constraints on force compositions and attrition levels are in some way functions of the
same factors. The specific functions relating the factors are the characteristic equations.
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In general mathematical notation, these can be expressed as shown in Equations (3.2)
through (3.4).
TIME = f(ENEMY FORCE, FRIENDLY FORCE, BASIC LOAD) (eqn 3.2)
FORCE = g(ENEMY FORCE,FRIENDLY FORCE,BASIC LOAD) (eqn 3.3)
CASUL = h(ENEMY FORCE, FRIENDLY FORCE, BASIC LOAD) (eqn 3.4)
First, the friendly force size is varied over a constant starting value of
ammunition load to determine feasible solutions. Each time a combination fails in
terms of overall time and casualties, the assault force is incremented one platoon. If all
sizes of the assault force fail to produce a successful assault, in terms of time and
casualty constraints, the next level of the tree network varies ammunition load over
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Figure 3.3 Example Tree Diagram.
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Totaling the time and casualty results over all arcs (activities) results in a
solution. The results become the time and activity constraints that describe the mission
orders of the next subordinate unit. The following section logically developes the urban
defense mission planning template in terms of the concepts discussed to this point.
B. MISSION TEMPLATE
The mission template must be specific enough to represent the essential activities
of a particular type of mission yet general enough to be applicable to variations caused
by changes in the planning level or scenario. In addition, it should logically mesh with
higher and lower templates of likely follow-on missions. All templates are planned from
first activity to last activity as a sequence of events leading to successful mission
accomplishment. In developing the following template, the scenario presented in the
first chapter is used. While the specific situation has a U.S. task force defending a
segment patterned built-up area, the candidate planning network is equally useful for
planning the defense of any of the other patterned built-up areas. The network is also
applicable at planning levels above a battalion task force. The size of the forces
involved does not alter the sequence of events and, for those scenarios that omit
particular activities, inputs of zero for the arc characteristic equations generally alter
the outcome appropriately.
The development of the mission template is essentially a description of activities
ahd events for an urban defense in consonance with the doctrinal ideas already
discussed. However, an aspect of the Force Planning Model limiting the sequencing of
activities is the fact that the current version of the model cannot simultaneously attrite
two forces performing parallel activities. For example, the covering force engagement
cannot be modeled simultaneously with the execution of the main defense battle. In
contrast, artillery can cause attrition, by either modeling fire missions as separate
activities in sequence with other activities or by having artillery attrition accounted- for
implicitly in the attrition characteristic equations of other combat activities. This
limitation occurs because, unlike PERT networks which determine critical path based
on time alone, the Force Planning Model uses time as well as force make up and
casualties as criteria in calculating a solution through the network. The current version
of the model cannot solve a network with this degree of complexity built into parallel
arcs.
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1. U.S. Urban Defense Planning Template
Recalling the scenario and the task organization, note that each combat asset
has a specific role in the defense that consists of one or more activities. A salient
feature of a U.S. defense of a built-up area is engaging the enemy well forward of the
built-up area. This is primarily the role of a mobile covering and security force.
Artillery supports with fires forward of the built up area, particularly against enemy
assembly and attack areas. However, artillery fire support capabilities are limited as the
battle moves into the built-up area proper because of the decreased effectiveness of
indirect fire in urban areas. Engineers are employed in preparing demolitions, obstacles
and key positions for the defense. Successful defense of a built-up area usually predicts
a counterattack as a follow-on mission for armor and mechanized forces if the enemy
has been removed from the urban area or by light infantry forces if he still has a
foothold. At a minimum, the counterattack has as its objective the reestablishment of
the covering force and security zone. The network pictured in Figure 3.4 depicts the



































ERING FORCE MOVE TO ZONE
ILLERY ECHELON TO FIRING POSITION
ENSE FORCE MOVE TO URBAN AREA
ILLERY COMPLET OCCUPATION OF FIRING POSITION
ENSE FORCE ESTABLISH HASTY URBAN DEFENSE
ERING FORCE FIGHT RECON ELEMENT
ERING FORCE MOVE TO ALTERNATE FLANK POSITION
N DEFENSE FIGHT FOOTHOLD ASSAULT
ERING FORCE FIGHT ADVANCED GUAPD
PARE DEMOLITIONS AND KEY OBSTACLES
PARE URBAN DELIBERATE DEFENSE AND ALTERNATE/SUPPLEMENTAL PSNS
ILLERY FIRE AGAINST FIRST ECHELON ATTACK FORMATIONS
IN DEFENSE DEFEATS ASSAULT ON URBAN AREA BY MAIN BODY
EPARE TO ECECUTE THE COUNTERATTACK PLAN
Figure 3.4 U.S. Urban Defense Template.
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2. Sequence of Events
Consider the network as linking three phases of battle: the preparation phase,
the covering force operation and the main defense phase. The events of the three
phases are now briefly described in relation to the network shown in Figure 3.4.
a. Preparation Phase
This phase includes arc activities between nodes one through five and the
three activities leaving node four. These activities account for the covering force
establishing security forward of the built-up area and covering the occupation and
preparation of a hasty defense within the built-up area. A hasty defense is established
when crew served weapons are emplaced, sectors of fire established, fields of fire
cleared, and communications tied in between elements. The hasty defense precedes
improving positions towards establishing a deliberate defense. The dummy arc between
nodes three and two is critical to the mission timing since it requires the covering force
to be positioned first to screen the movement to and occupation of the built-up area by
the main defense force. The direction of the arc must be specified in the input to the
Force Planning Model as going from node three to node two because the solver
completely services nodes from lowest numbered to highest numbered. The two long
arcs leaving node four and ending in nodes nine and ten, demonstrate that these
activities continue until actual battle is joined inside the urban area. The timing reflects
both defensive fundamentals of continuously preparing any defense as long as time
permits and the need of having key demolitions emplaced before enemy reconnaissance
elements can attempt to seize key objectives.
b. Covering Force Operation
The covering force activities consist of detecting and engaging the enemy's
recon element. Perhaps as important is securing the flanks against enemy attempts to
isolate and bypass the built-up area. These activities are represented by arc and node
combinations five through nine. Since the network presents an optimistic sequencing
of activities and is modeled against Soviet attack doctrine, the covering force stops the
reconnaissance element, moves to supplemental positions oriented on the flank avenue
of approaches, and prevents the advanced guard from bypassing or isolating the built-
up area. All of these activities are planned to occur before the main defense engages
the assault by the main body. In fact, according to Soviet doctrine, bypass or isolation
must fail before a deliberate assault is made on the built-up area.
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c. Main Defense Phase
A major assumption of this portion of the network is that the covering
force action is successful in preventing isolation of the built-up area and the enemy is
forced to conduct an attack to clear it. Effective use is made of supporting fires to
harass and disrupt the enemy's attack formations. A possible variation would add
another set of arcs and nodes following node eleven depicting the intended use of
reserves in stopping the assault. However, since the reserve is likely to be used and
reconstituted repeatedly throughout urban combat its use is left as implied in the single
activity between nodes ten and eleven. Ultimately, a reconstituted reserve is used to
counterattack, evict the enemy from the urban terrain and reestablish the security zone.
Thus, the proposed planning network is a logical progression of activities
which reflect current doctrine on urban defense. The network's generality allows
encompassing forces at any level of planning. The network is flexible enough for
modeling most urban defensive scenarios.
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN MODEL
To this point the structure of the Force Planning Model has been presented and
a candidate urban defense planning network described. The arc characteristic equations
are the elements of the model that integrate the two concepts. This section is organized
in six parts. First the assumptions are stated. The remaining sections document the
development of the candidate changeable and immutable factors and the three types of
arc characteristic equations: duration, force makeup, and attrition. Some of these
elements are developed to model urban and/ or light infantry aspects of combat
specifically. Others are useful in any general combat scenario under appropriate
assumptions. The emphasis is on the logic behind each equation, the assumptions on
which it is based, and its limitations. In most cases, numerical values for the
parameters are not discussed at this point. However, Appendix C contains the data file
used in running the defense planning network in the Force Planning Model. The
numbers shown in the input files are discussed in the next chapter.
1. Assumptions
As stated earlier, the ground combat elements represented in the model are
limited to tanks, APCs, infantry, anti-armor, artillery,and enginers for simplicity. The
combat power for each is derived from Standard Units of Armament (SUA) estimates.
The SUA values used are based on those used in the prototype Force Planning Model
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for a Soviet river crossing. A thesis by Manzo and Hughes gives alternative values and
relative conversion factors based on the T-62 tank as a reference entity [Ref. 9]. The
two sets of values are comparable; however, Manzo and Hughes base their estimates
on weapons caliber and dispersion factors. The estimates used in the Force Planning
Model are aggregate values that implicitly account for numerous factors such as
armament, mobility and range. In either case, the assertion is that the values are fair
representations of relative combat power. Because the model requires that SUAs be
summed across the different elements, the total combat power of a conceptual unit is
viewed as if it is a homogeneous force. The strength of a particular force increases or
decreases in proportion to the number and type of elements in its make up.
An important set of assumptions pertaining to the attrition submodels
(characteristic equations) concern the "nature of the attrition rate coefficients. The
majority of the submodels used are applications of Lanchester's classic combat
formulations drawn from Taylor's research [Ref. 10]. In particular, urban and urban
peripheral combat situations are modeled under Lanchester's square law, also known
as equations of modern warfare with constant coefficients.
dx / dt = -ay (eqn 3.5)
dy / dt = -bx (eqn 3.6)
These were selected because they are simple to program and they have several
associated forms with closed form solutions that express other combat results such as
duration of battle and surviving force sizes.
Assume the coefficients remain constant for any particular engagement but
can have differing values depending upon the force compositions and point in time of
the battle. This is accomplished, as will be seen, by creating different immutable
attrition factors for each change in situation. Creating these factors raises the issue of
coefficient estimation. The problem with estimating attrition rate coefficients is
accounting for the many factors that determine a kill rate. Certainly, at a minimum,
they are functions of time ' and relative force sizes. Various arguments exist for
rationalizing how they change. Essentially, two primary methods are available for
estimating coefficients, the COMAN and the Bonder/ Farrell.
COMAN depends upon a high resolution simulation that outputs a detailed
casualty history over time. The data must include the time of occurance of each
casualty, which force sustained the casualty, and the size of the force after the casualty.
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Attrition coefficients are calculated external to the simulation through use of the high
resolution data and a fitted parameter approach. In the case of COMAN, the fitted
parameter is the maximum likelihood estimate of the time between casualties. The main
assumption of the method is that casualties occur randomly and independently
according to a memoryless Markov Process. Therefore, by the memoryless property of
the exponential distribution the likelihood function becomes the product of the
independent probabilities of each casualty occuring in a given time.
The Bonder/ Farrell approach does not rely on a high resolution simulation.
Analysis determines the acquisition time and kill time which are summed to give the
total time for a firer to kill a target. The method uses a renewal or semi-Markov
process and assumes that shots are independently repeated until a kill occurs. From
this the probability of a single shot kill is calculated. By using the geometric
distribution, the expected time for a kill to occur (first success in k trials) is calculated.
This is accomplished by taking the probability a target is killed on a particular shot,
multiplying by the shot number, and summing this product over the total shots fired.
The inverse of the expected time to kill is the firing rate. When multiplied by the
probability of a single shot kill, the attrition rate coefficient results.
The attrition coefficients used in the the urban network are in units of SUAs
killed per firer per hour. They are not values obtained from either of the two methods
per se but are estimates based on contemporary Force Planning Model usage. In its
fully operational form, ALARM will make use of one of the formal methods for
estimating.
2. Changeable Factors
The remainder of this chapter references Appendix C, the sample input for the
Force Planning Model. Cross references appear in the appendix at appropriate
locations and serve as examples. The changeable factors fit into one of five categories.
A commander/ staff can effect the battle through decisions dealing with movement of
units, allocation of planning time, logistics, obstacle planning, and task organization.
The five factors are in line with the tenants of Airland Battle doctrine presented in the
first chapter.
The movement of units is classified as either tactical or administrative. The
former is typically conducted using one of the tactical movement techniques: travelling,
travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch. Administrative moves are usually in
convoy. Because speed is terrain dependent, movement intervals are the only factors
that are changeable. This category of factor is refered to as spacing.
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The operations and planning category has the single changeable factor, time to
prepare for the counterattack. Preparation time is included as a changeable factor
because a commander decides how soon after defeating the enemy assault to initiate
the counterattack. Depending on the plan developed and the condition of weapons and
troops, the counterattack can be immediate or it can take time to reorganize and
augment the reserve. If the enemy still retains small portions of the built-up area, the
counterattack is conducted with the dismounted infantry reserve. If the enemy is
completely evicted from the built-up area, the mechanized and armored units
counterattack and pursue to reestablish the security zone and maintain contact with
the enemy.
Logistics sustains operations. As stated earlier, the number of combat
elements explicitly considered in the model are reduced to a manageable number. The
many classes of supply that sustain this force are also reduced for simplification.
Artillery ammunition is the only supply item currently represented in the model.The
percent fired in support is the changeable factor and contributes to modeling preplanned
artillery fires. Time often expresses the mission requirement in actual preplanned fires.
As an illustration, an order might call for a ten minute prep on an objective. However,
for the simulation, modeling the fire support mission against the enemy's attack
formations uses tons of ammunition fired for expressing the mission requirement. There
are several reasons for doing this. First, it builds logistics consumption into the model,
which is a realistic constraint on operations. Second, the changeable factor relates to
time through the firing rate (expressed in tons fired per gun per hour), another factor
easily measured.
Obstacle emplacement has been modeled in several of the terrain and unit
placement network algorithms already designed for ALARM. Therefore, it is natural
that it should be considered pertinent to urban networks as well. The number of
obstacles emplaced as part of a defensive plan impacts on overall mission completion
time and is a changeable factor categorized under obstacles.
Finally, a commander can array his forces to fit a number of concepts of
operation. The forces available in the urban model allows the task organization to vary
within the covering force, the main defense, the flank defense, and the reserve. The
changeable factors are expressed as fractions of organic units assigned to a conceptual
force. The conceptual forces vary in size as well as composition. This type of
changeable factor also allows artillery missions and priority of fires to be implicitly
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modeled. As an illustration, a priority of fire mission translates into allocating all of the
artillery SUAs to a specific conceptual unit, such as the covering force. Table 6
summarizes the changeable factors.
TABLE 6







time to prepare to execute the counterattack
LOGISTICS
tons of ammunition for support
artillery mission allocation
OBSTACLES
number of obstacles to prepare
TASK ORGANIZATION






Not all immutable factors are tangible planning considerations. Some are
implied in a commander's consideration of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops,
and time). Those that are implicit are the truely immutable factors over which he
cannot exercise control, such as attrition rates. However, in the Force Planning Model
they are explicitly defined. The immutable factors for the urban planning network are
categorized as either movement, attrition, opposing force organization, weapon/ terrain
physical characteristics, or operations related. These are briefly described below and
summarized in Table 7. Again, Appendix C provides examples for cross reference.
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The first category, movement, includes distance and speed factors used in
planning maneuver of forces. Those factors considered explicitly in a movement plan
are travel distances, the size and composition of forces, and the movement technique.
The factors that are implied when formulating a plan are road and cross country
speeds and the physical dimensions of the elements being moved.
TABLE 7




vehicle cross country speed (»»<* tech factor)
pax road speed
pax cross country speed* (and tech factor)
number of vehicles per formation
number of pax per formation
number of formations (per conceptual unit)
formation angle (terrain dependent)
ATTRITION
friendly direct fire' attrition rate
enemy direct fire attrition rate
friendly indirect fire attrition rate
enemy indirect fire attrition rate
friendly urban attrition' rate
enemy urban attrition rate
artillery casualties expected per ton fired
artillery probability of detection
friendly urban clearing rate
•NOTE: "PAX* is a term associated with the movement of personnel
and equipment, and
commonly used in infantry units.
OPPOSINC ORGANIZATION





firing rate for artillery (tons/hr)
built-up area volume
percentage of urbanization (density)
percent of urban area defended
OPERATION RELATED
number of positions to prepare




Virtually all of the immutable factors relating to attrition are factors not
specifically considered when analyzing courses of action. However, a commander's
consideration of placing forces in a particular position or moving along a specific route
will include the expected vulnerability to casualties. Attrition rate coefficients are
examples of immutable factors that are considered in general ways when comparing
enemy and friendly capabilities. A unit requesting priority of fires is implicitly
attempting to increase its attrition rate. Attrition rate factors are explicitly defined in
the network as attrition rate coefficients for direct, indirect and urban fires. Other
factors that are defined are probabilities of hit and kill for artillery fire. Immutable
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attrition factors are integral parts of the characteristic equations describing combat
activities.
As stated earlier, a realistic method for determining the anticipated enemy
course of action is weighting a pessimistic, expected and optimistic estimation of a
particular capability. Immutable factors that determine enemy organization are defined
in terms of fractional parts of units assigned to conceptual forces, such as the advance
guard or recon element. In reality, the enemy's actual strength and composition are
seldom known with certainty. Consequently, analysis of the enemy's capabilities results
in planning against a likely course of action whether it be the worst case .expected or
best case. The weighting equation models the requirement to plan against some enemy
course of action.
Physical characteristics of weapons and terrain are fixed factors. They impact
on the length of battle and engagement outcomes. Both factors are explicitly
considered in actual planning and thus, are included in the urban planning network.
Examples of the factors used are artillery firing rate and the ratio of built-up area to
total sector size.
Operational related immutable factors include times to execute plans, prepare
positions, and emplace obstacles. Again, the pessimistic, expected, and optimistic
estimates are used in the model much the same way that they are considered in actual
planning situations.
4. Duration Equations
Duration equations are the characteristic equations that determine the time to
complete an activity of the network. The equations used in the urban planning network
are grouped into three types: duration of movements, duration of engagements, and
task durations. The first group models the time required for making administrative or
tactical moves. They are embellishments of the D=RxT formula. The factors that
describe a convoy or road march are:
• Time - T
• A representative vehicle length - L
• A column interval - I
c
• The total number of vehicles in the column - N_
• The distance to be traveled - D
• The speed of the column - S
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The assumptions of the model are that all vehicles are of the same length and
move at a constant speed. Figure 3.5 diagrams the concept.
Figure 3.5 Diagram of Convoy Movement.
Tactical moves use one of the tactical movement techniques. Whereas the
column moves in serial, the basic formation of a tactical move is the wedge. The
wedges themselves move in serial (traveling and traveling overwatch) or in tandem
(bounding overwatch) with intervals between and within formations dependent upon
the terrain being traversed. The factors describing a tactical move are:
• Time - T
• The number of wedges - W
• The number of entities per wedge - N
e
• The inter-entity interval - I
e
• The inter-wedge interval - Iw
• The distance to move - D
• The wedge apex angle - 6
• A technique factor - tf
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They are combined to describe the time to move by Equation 3.8.
(eqn 3.8)
T =
(W - 1.0)1 w + { [ C.5N - 1.0)1 „ ] SIN G } W + D
The model assumes constant speed, equal sized formations and that the angle
decreases as terrain becomes more restrictive. The technique factor accounts for the
slower movement of the overwatch formations. Figure 3.6 diagrams the concept.
WEDGE 1 WEDGE
2
Figure 3.6 Diagram of Tactical Movement.
The duration equations which model length of engagements in the urban
planning network are mostly extensions of the square law [Ref. 10: p. 129] by
Lanchester. However, because of the homogeneity assumption and the different nature
of fighting within built-up areas, two other equations are used that describe
heterogeneous combat and combat in built-up areas, respectively. The parameters in
the square law length of battle equation are:
• Time - T
• The friendly attrition rate coefficient - a
• The enemy attrition rate coefficient - p
• The starting friendly force size - YQ
• The starting enemy force size - X Q
rX
BP• The enemy fractional breakpoint - f t>p
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Lanchester's equation is expressed as follows:
(eqn 3.9)
1.0
T = 7=* In
(^) r,»*y^"-"'",!i
An assumption of the model is the Y-force wins a fixed breakpoint battle
against the X-force. The model yields the number of survivors for the winning side and
assumes that the losing side is reduced" to its breakpoint strength. Since the network
principle itself assumes a successful completion of the activities by the friendly side (in
this case the U.S.), the enemy is always assumed to reach his breakpoint first.
Therefore, the condition expressed by Equation 3.10 must first be checked to see if it
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A model that accounts for differing attrition effects due to direct and indirect
fire is appropriate in engagements where the attrition contributions of each are able to
be distinguished. For example, the covering force usually has priority of artillery fires
to support its direct fires. Equation 3.11 is adopted from the prototype river crossing
planning network. Its input parameters are as follows:
• Time - T
• The enemy fractional breakpoint - fXgp
• The percent casualties due to direct fire - Cj
• The percent casualties due to indirect fire - C:
• The friendly direct fire attrition rate - o. a
• The friendly indirect fire attrition rate - P
• The starting enemy force size - XQ
• The starting friendly force size - YQ
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The parameters are related in Equation 3.11.
(eqn3.11)
T _
(f' BP -1.0)C d
|








Assumptions are constant and independent attrition rate coefficients and that
the percentage of casualties due to each type of fire is deterministic and represented as
a proportion.
Fighting in cities is a protracted form of combat. Destroying an enemy means
his positions have to be physically cleared in close combat. The requirement to
methodically clear each built-up structure accounts for the long engagement times. As
the resistance increases, the total battle time increases, but at a faster rate. This
suggests that an exponential function models the engagement time. The following
equation is used in two situations. It determines the time for a defender to evict an
entrenched enemy or the time for a defender attrite an attacker to breakpoint from
static positions. For this latter use a defense enhancement factor is included and
represents the value a defender gains by occupying defensive positions and letting the
attacker attempt to clear him out. The variables describing urban physical dimensions
and percentages occupied are relative to the situational use of the equation. The
following variables describe the model.
• Time - T
• The total urban volume - V
• The percent of the total volume urbanized - IL
• The percent of the urban volume defended - U^
• The clearing rate - R
• The starting enemy force - X Q
• The starting friendly force - YQ
• A defense enhancement factor - fj
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Assumptions for the model are that the clearing rate is constant and inversely
proportional to the size of the force being cleared. The urban volume represents the
size of the built-up area seized by the enemy assault that must be cleared. The
percentage of the volume that is urban terrain is the density characteristic explained in
the second chapter. The diagram at Figure 3.7 is a graphical representation of the
urban volume factors. Note that if the enemy does not gain a foothold prior to his
assault, no urban clearing by the defending force is necessary. In this case, Lanchester's
square law is used to model attrition for the main defensive battle .
URBAN ORDERLY BLOCK (12) - APPROX. 40* URBAN
I AVERAGE BLDG
'HEIGHT Cm)
Figure 3.7 Urban Terrain Model.
The last group of duration equations concern task completion times. These
are tasks that are commonly found in ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation
Program) manuals or training manuals and arc stated as performance standards. In this
respect, they describe discrete time events having the form of changeable or immutable
factors. In the urban network, specific activities that are also considered as tasks are
time spent occupying the artillery position, occupying the defense, preparing positions
and demolitions, and organizing for the counterattack.
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5. Force Makeup Equation
The force makeup equation keeps track of the current composition and
strength of the opposing forces. The SUA, as described earlier, is the unit of
measurement of an entity's combat power. All entities have a SUA and thus, total
combat power is additive over the number and types of entities making up a
conceptual unit. The fractions of the organic units allocated to the conceptual forces
for the friendly side are changeable factors. An example is the fraction of the
mechanized company or the armored platoon that comprises the covering force. The
fractions of enemy original units allocated to conceptual forces are immutable factors,
as pointed out earlier. An example of this is the fraction of the regimental artillery
group allocated to the advanced guard. The characteristic equation used throughout
the network model is shown by Equation 3.13. The Force Planning Model
continuously keeps track of three values based on the starting value of a force. At any
time in the sequence of activities the original and current SUA values are determined,
as well as the remaining number of entities in a unit.
(eqn 3.13)
F = L . (fraction of organic unit- in conceptual units
.) (SUA .) for all j
6. Attrition Equations
An extension of the square law equation with constant attrition rate
coefficients is used in conjunction with the respective equation for duration of battle.
The specific form is shown by Equation 3.14. The same conditions that make the
duration equation applicable are necessary for this relationship to hold. The model
yields the number of survivors for the winning side and assumes that the losing side is
reduced to its breakpoint strength. If the particular values of the input factors are not
consistent with this assumption, the program returns an infeasibility message and the
appropriate factors have to be adjusted. The logic of assuming a successful outcome of
the mission is, after all, the basis from which plans are formulated.
(eqn 3.14)
i-o-p7Sn-(f x BP> 2}
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Two other attrition equations model the effects of artillery and counterbattery
fire. Attrition caused by indirect fire is modeled by first defining the following variables:
• The surviving enemy force - Xf
• The current enemy force size - X
c
• The expected casualties per ton of ammunition - C
t
• The total tons of ammunition available - T
a
• The percentage allocated to the mission - Tf










Counterbattery fire is a risk run by an artillery unit actively engaged in
support. The length of the fire mission, to a large extent, relates to the probability of
being pinpointed for counterbattery fire. Thus, a simple model relating mission
duration to casualties uses the following variables.
• The surviving friendly force - Yf
• The current friendly unit size - YQ
• The enemy indirect fire attrition rate - P •
• The length of the mission - t
• The probability of being detected - Pj
• The probability of a counterbattery hit - P^
Equation 3.16 describes the relationship of the variables.
(eqn3.16)
Y f= Y 0-P tP d Ph Y o
This chapter has described the Force Planning Model and detailed the input
requirements for the urban combat scenario. The candidate urban planning network
has been structured for use in the Force Planning Model. Variables relevant to the
network of activities and the assumptions underlying their use were defined. The
mathematical submodels relating the variables and the respective simplifying
assumptions were explained. The planning network is implemented in the following
chapter.
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IV. URBAN MODEL ANALYSIS
Planning an urban defense has been modeled using network methodologies
developed for ALARM. The method sequences the activities that comprise a deliberate
defense mission. Implied in the model's development is the assumption that such a
methodology reasonably represents the actual execution of a plan. Specific assumptions
regarding the mathematical constructs were stated in the last chapter. The explanatory
variables and the dependent variables were presented as factors and characteristics. The
characteristic equations express the variable interrelationships as mathematical
submodels. The next step is analyzing- the reasonableness the selected values for the
variables and the results produced by the mathematical submodels. A sample solution
of the urban template by The Force Planning Model is used as a base case. Appendix
C documents the input programs and gives the values of the changeable and immutable
factors used in the base case. The resulting solution is one tactical option for the
defense of Eiterfeld and is expressed by these factors. The final section of the chapter
analyzes several important equations: the characteristic equations drawn from the
square law and the original mathematical construct that calculates the duration of the
urban battle.
A. ANALYSIS OF BASE CASE INPUTS
1. Factors
The task force organizes into a covering/flank force, a main defense force, and
a reserve. These are the conceptual forces that participate in the activities of the
network. The force makeup equations determine the strength of the conceptual forces
by surnming the fractional parts (SUAs) of the organic.units assigned to a conceptual
force. The fractional parts are changeable factors. In the covering force.the mechanized
company and the tank platoon combine to form a company' team. The composition of
this force varies in platoon increments. Those mechanized and armor platoons not used
in the covering force may be assigned to the flank or main force. The flank position is
the alternate position taken by the covering force following its engagement with the the
enemy reconnaissance element. The remnants of the covering force join an established
flank force composed of infantry, anti-armor, and possibly some portion of the mech
or armor not used in the original covering force. Two infantry companies, the balance
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of the anti-armor weapons not used on the flank, and the engineer platoon form the
base of the main defense. The main defense can be incremented by platoons of the
third infantry company and the tank, platoon. A reserve of at least one platoon from
the third infantry company is required but varies upwards to an entire company. Figure
4.1 summarizes the conceptual force compositions produced for the base case of the
model and indicates the range of values considered.
NAME OF FACTOR SOLUTION VALUE RANGE
FRACTION OF MECH -IN COVERING FORCE 1 .0000 .3333 - 1.0000
FRACTION OF ARMOR IN COVERING FORCE 1 .0000 .0000 - 1.0000
FRACTION OF MECH IN MAIN DEFENSE . 0000 .0000 . 3333
FRACTION OF ARMOR IN MAIN DEFENSE .0000 .0000 - 1.0000
FRACTION OF COMPANY A IN MAIN DEFENSE 1 . 0000 1 0000
FRACTION OF COMPANY B IN MAIN DEFENSE 1 . 0000 1 0000
FRACTION OF COMPANY C IN MAIN DEFENST .0000 .0000 - 1.0000
FRACTION OF AT ASSETS IN MAIN DEFENSE .4444 .0000 .8888
FRACTION OF BATTERY D IN MAIN DEFEUST 1 .0000 1 0000
FRACTION OF ENGINEERS IN MAIN DEFENSE 1 .0000 1 0000
FRACTION OF MECH SECURING FLANKS .0000 .0000 - .6666
FRACTION OF ARMOR SECURING FLANKS .0000 . 0000 - 1.0000
FRACTION OF COMPANY C SECURING FLANKS .6666 .0000 - 1 . 0000
FRACTION AT ASSETS ON FLANKS .5554 . 0000 - 1.0000
FRACTION CO C IN RESERVE .3333 . 3333 - 1.0000
Figure 4.1 Friendly and Enemy Force Organizations.
The Soviet regiment organizes into a standard march column configuration
consisting of a reconnaissance element, advance guard, and a main body. The units in
the march column are the conceptual enemy forces that participate in the network of
activities. Each conceptual force is a combined arms organization. The regimental
artillery group (RAG) divides between the advance guard and the main body. The
recon platoon, a tank platoon from the tank battalion, and a motorized platoon from
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one of the motorized rifle battalions (MRB) comprise the conceptual recon force. At
least one motorized rifle company, a tank platoon , and a portion of the RAG make
up the advance guard. The remaining forces of the regiment organize into the main
body. The portion of the reconnaissance force surviving the covering force battle
becomes the force that conducts the enemy foothold assault. The fractional pessimistic
estimate of the organic forces making up the conceptual forces is generally twice the
standard value, and the optimistic value is generally one third the standard value. The
fractional values are immutable factors. The base case enemy task organization is a
weighted sum of these immutable factors. [Ref. 11]
The first file shown in Appendix C is the initialization file for the test run. A
required mission completion time of 72 hours is set for completing the mission. The
Force Planning Model was originally designed around an offensive mission, the Soviet
regimental river crossing. In the context of an offensive mission, the time required is a
maximum bound on the mission duration. Thus, the model attempts to find the best
solution that is less than the specified time. A minimum time makes sense for an
offensive mission order because operations orders for an attack usually specify a no-
later-than-time for seizing the objective. Defensive mission time constraints are usually
specified as lower bounds because a defending mission orders a force to hold a position
at least for a specified time. Since the Force Planning Model currently finds a minimum
time through the network, even for a defensive mission, the model's time constraint
cannot always have a maximum bound interpretation. For the defensive scenario,
interpret the time as describing the expected mission duration. An improved version of
the model under development at Rolands and Associates will have the capability for
selecting an upper or lower bound depending on the mission. Nonetheless, interpreting
the 72 hours as an expected time for completing the mission is reasonable. For
example, it is reasonable under the assumption that the task force organization is in
effect for 72 hours or that the task force knows it will receive another mission in 72
hours. Both examples frequently occur in actual planning situations.
The conceptual friendly and enemy force breakpoints are also given in the
initialization file. Define the breakpoint as that point, relative to force size, at which a
unit can no longer perform its current mission. In general, assume that a force in the
defense has a lower breakpoint than a force in the offense. Consequently, a value of 40
percent of original strength is used for as an average defensive breakpoint and a value
of 60 percent for the offense. These values vary with the particular activity and unit.
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Because some conceptual forces enter several engagements, their breakpoints are
sensitive to the cumulative effects of multiple battles. As an illustration, the enemy
reconnaissance force fights twice, first against the covering force and then against the
main defense to gain a foothold on the built-up area. The breakpoint in the first
engagement is 20 percent. Consequently, in the second engagement the reconnaissance
force will accept fewer casualties and the breakpoint is set to 60 percent of the strength
entering this engagement.
Recall that the changeable factor values for the friendly task organization are
defined as the fractional parts of the original units used in forming the conceptual
forces. Other changeable factor values deal with spacing during movement, planning
operations, logistics, and obstacles. The values for the factors under these categories
are now briefly addressed. The spacing values include the convoy and tactical
movement intervals. The intervals reflect widely practiced tactics by most mechanized,
armored and infantry units. Under the category of planning operations, preparing for
the counterattack is the time required for implementing the counterattack plan by
moving troops and effecting coordination called for in the plan. The values used in the
model are the author's estimates of these changeable factors. The tons of ammo
available for support and the percent ammunition fired in support changeable factors are
categorized as logistics factors. The former factor is calculated in tons based on fifteen
pound rounds, an average firing rate of three rounds per minute, and a required total
support time of between eight and twelve hours, without resupply. The data, from
standard information available on weapons, are averages taken over several similar
weapons systems [Ref. 12]. One remaining changeable factor is the number of obstacles
to prepare. For reasons of simplification the two bridges in Eiterfeld are the only
planned obstacles.
The immutable factors defining enemy task organization were previously
described. Of the remaining immutable factors, several are justified as easily measured
values, such as vehicle and building dimensions. Others are assigned values that are
found in manuals such as ARTEPs (Army Training and Evaluation Program) and
SQTs (Skill Qualification Tasks), such as the time to occupy a battery firing position.
Those that are not self explanatory are the rate factors. The justification for using
constant attrition rate coefficients was made in the last chapter. In terms of values,
assume a defender destroys between zero and three attackers in an hour and an
attacker, at a natural disadvantage, destroys between zero and two defenders per hour.
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Converting these rates into SUAs per hour yields the values given in Appendix C. The
building clearing rate is a reasonable estimate derived from the author's small unit level
experience. Assume an typical building has dimensions of 10m x 10m x 30m (LxWxH).
One person can tactically clear the typical building volume in ten minutes (or 300m
per minute) Therefore, a company of 160 personnel clears 2,800,000 m in an hour.
Define a cubic kilometer as 1000m by 1000m by the average building height, where the
average building height depends on the urban density pattern as defined in Chapter II.
For the purpose of this explanation, assume a height of 30m. If 20 percent of the
buildings in the cubic kilometer are defended, then a clearing rate of .48 cubic
kilometers per hour results. Because actual photographs of Eiterfeld are not available,
the percent defended and density of buildings are estimates based on what a European
town of this size probably has.
2. Characteristic Equations
The military analyst is interested in how tactics and weapons effects combine
in determining the outcome of a battle. Because modern battles have not usually
resulted in the annihilation of one side, one assumes that each side has a point where
fighting must terminate. Just as there are many complex factors that enter into
attrition rates, there are also many factors that enter into determining battle
termination points. Lanchester's square law is one model that aggregates both
attrition and termination factors and produces deterministic battle results that depend
on force size. One of the simplest ways to define these termination points is by using
relative force size. In the urban network, the square law model applies to the covering
force battle, the engagement against the enemy foothold assault, and the urban battle
itself. The size of friendly force surviving these engagements depends on three factors in
the square law model:
• the initial force ratio - X /YQ
• the ratio of the attrition coefficients - a/p
• • the relative breakpoints - fXgp , f^gp
Equation 3.10 relates these three factors and states the condition that must hold to
assume that one side (in this case the U.S. side) wins an engagement. [Ref. 10: pp. 128
to 131]
For analyzing how these three relative factors interact to determine the
outcome of battle, a FORTRAN program was written. The program completly
innumerates the solutions to Equation 3.10 for the range of values given below.
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• the initial force ratio (enemy: friendly) - 1:3 to 3:1
• the attrition coefficients (SUAs/hr) - .5 to 3.0 (a) and .5 to 2.0 (P)
• breakpoints - .1 to .9 for each force
At each force ratio, over 1500 combinations of the other factors are possible,
resulting in over 21,504 total battle situations for consideration. Each time a loosing
condition occured at a particular force ratio, it was counted. By counting the number
of loosing conditions, information about the chances of winning at each force ratio was
obtained. The force ratio is used as the pivotal relationship since it most closely
represents a changeable factor; that is, something a commander can control. On the
other hand, attrition rate coefficients and breakpoints are more complex factors that
are not necessarily controlable by anything a commander or staff can do. From the
results of the analysis, some general statements can be made regarding how well the
square law equation approximates reality. A basis for these statements is the adage
that an attacker should have a three to one force advantage over the defender to have
a reasonable chance of winning.
Another point of analysis is the assumption made earlier that a defender
accepts more casualties and thus has a lower breakpoint for battle termination. The
results show that a defender with a 1:3 force advantage (that is a force ratio of .3)
almost always wins. His chances of winning are better than 50 percent as long as the
force ratio is 1:1 or better, in favor of the defender. As the ratio of forces increases to
the attackers advantage, the defender's chances of winning rapidly diminish to 15
percent at a 2:1 ratio. At the classic 3:1 ratio in favor of an attacker, the defender only
wins 2 percent of the time. A closer look at the complete enumeration of battle
conditions verifys the assumption that a defender can win by accepting a lower
breakpoint. At the force ratios favoring the attacker, the defender still wins as long as
two conditions hold. The first condition requires the defender to attrite the enemy at a
substantially faster rate. For the particular values of attrition coefficients used, a has to
be at its maximum value and P has to be at or near its minimum. The second condition
that occurs simultaneously with the first, in nearly every instance where the defender
wins against odds of 2:1 or better, is that the defender's breakpoint is less than the
attacker's. At extreme force ratios favoring the attacker, the defender's breakpoint had
to be at its minimum.
These results appeal to intuition and what has been learned from past battles.
While recognizing that attrition rates and breakpoints represent the aggregation of
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numerous complex factors, most of which are beyond a commander's control, the
results of this analysis correlate with steps actually used by defending units to enhance
the chances of winning. For example, hardening positions and fighting from positions
located on key terrain are efforts that artificially increase the force ratio to the
defender's advantage. Preplanning artillery, enplacing mines, and covering obstacles by
fire are all ways of artificially increasing the defender's attrition rate against an
attacker.
If an attacker does not gain a foothold on a built-up area prior to initiating an
assault against it, the difficulty of the attack increases. However, for a defender,
preventing an attacker from gaining a foothold is also difficult because the defender
can seldom secure every avenue of approach into a built-up area. Equation 3.12 models
the time it takes a defending force to- clear an attacker from a foothold area he is
attacking through. The equation is also useful for modeling the time an attacker takes
clearing a defender from urban defensive positions. For this latter use assume the
defender remains stationary in his positions and thus, rather than evicting the attacker
by counter assaults, defeats him from a positional defense. The sample case models the
situation where the attacker gains a foothold and is evicted by counter assault. The
network is also easily modified for modeling a situation where the attacker assaults
without gaining a foothold by reverting to the set of square law characteristic
equations for the main defense activity.
Again, as a means for determining how Equation 3.12 resolves changes in the
input parameter values, a small FORTRAN program was written. The program varies
the force ratio in the equation over the same range of values used in the analysis of the
square law. The other parameters are held constant at the values used in the base case.
The sample case situation places the attacker in control of approximately a square
block of Eiterfeld and physically occupying 30 percent of the structures. Thus, as a
defense technique, the defender clears the enemy from this portion of seized terrain.
The actual force ratio used in the base case gives the attacker a 2:1 advantage. As the
force ratio increases in favor of the defender, the time needed to evict the attacking
force decreases rapidly. For example, at a 1:2 ratio in favor of the defender, the time
decreases from a 17 hour battle to a 5 hour battle. The reverse holds true when the
force ratio increases in favor of the attacker and, a 3:1 ratio results in a battle that
takes over 72 hours for the defense to win since the attacker occupies portions of
Eiterfeld (i.e., a foothold) in greater strength.
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Analysis of the same equation for a situation where a defending force defends
by remaining in static positions and wearing the attacker to his breakpoint involves
using the defense enhancement factor in Equation 3.12. As defined in the last chapter,
the defense factor represents a subjective evaluation of the strength a defender gains by
virtue of being in a defensive posture. It is subjective based on the type of defense
being conducted and the terrain being defended. Using the same FORTRAN program
and varying the defense enhancement factor between one and three, the results show
that a force defending from a strong position (a factor of three) can defeat an attacker
in substantially less time than if he were in a weaker posture.
The results obtained from the urban battle duration equation, Equation 3.12,
and the square law equations are reasonable and accurately approximate expected
actual outcomes of engagements. The 'parameters can change to represent different
tactical situations. The values of the changeable and immutable factors used as input
parameters to these and other characteristic equations are also justified and reasonable.
The urban network model remains to be implemented as a whole.
Sections of the solution to the base case situation are shown in the following
series of tables. The base case resulted in the mission being completed in under the 72
hour target time. The total of all activity times shown in Table 8 was 57.9 hours. The
durations of the activities agree with times one might expect occur. The covering force
took 6.5 hours to make a cross country tactical move of 50 km to the covering force
zone. Likewise, the dismounted infantry made a 20 km tactical cross country move in
13.2 hours. The artillery displaced by a convoy move over 15 km of hard surface road
in .68 hours, or about 45 minutes. Thus the movement equations predict reasonable
movement times.
The times required for completing the activities where forces engaged in
combat are also shown in Table 8. Note that the covering force battle with the
reconnaissance element lasted only 5 minutes. As expected, neither force is supposed to
become decisively engaged. Typically, a meeting engagement occurs and an rapid
assessment of the relative size and activity of the opposing force is made. This is called
developing the situation, following which forces would usually disengage. Any
engagement would be brief since, in this case, the covering force has considerably more
combat power than the recon element. As the advanced guard moves forward to
attempt to flank the defending force, the covering force moves to secure positions
where the flanks can be strengthened. The activity representing the battle between
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these two forces takes 15 minutes. Again, considering the long range fires available to
both sides, and the fact that both forces are predominatly armored and mechanized,
the duration of the engagement is within the bounds of reason.
TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF BASE CASE ACTIVITY TIMES
ARC NAME START END NBR DURA"- SLACK BLUE RED
NODE NODE PATHS UNIT UNIT
1 CF
.
MV.TO.ZONE 1 2 6 6.57 0. cover . fore red . recon
2 ARTY . MV.TO. PSN 1 3 12 0.6F 0. btryd red . rag





4 DEF . MV. TO. URBAN 2 4 12 13 . 2f 0. ma in . def en red . rag
5 ARTY .OCC .FIRE. PSN 3 4 6 0. 24 . htrvd red . rag
6 MAIN. FORCE. OCC 4 5 6 3 .00 . main de fen red . rag
7 CF. FIGHT. RED . REC 5 6 6 0.06 . i:over .fore red . recon
8 CF. MOVE. TO. FLANK 6 7 6 . SB 0. rover .fore red . recon
9 MAIN. DEF. FIGHT 7 8 6 0.12 0. nain . de f en red. f t -hid
10JCF". DEEEAT. ADV. G 8 9 6 0.13 . flank .defe adv
,
guard
11 ARTY .FIRE. SPT 9 10 12 1 .50 0. btryd main . body
12 MAIN. DEF -DEFEAT 10 11 9 17 .82 . main . de f en main . body
13 PREP. DEMO 4 9 6 14.00 . en<i red . rag
14 MAIN .DEF . PREP .A 4 10 6 20.52 0. blue.reser red . rag
15 PREP .TO . COUNTER 10 11 9 6.00 0. C m . in e c h main . body
Note from Table 9 that the casualties from this engagement, shown in units of
SUAs, reflect the vulnerability of the advanced guard to the long range fires from a
defender occupying key terrain. Since the heterogeneous character of a unit is lost
when aggregating SUAs into the total combat power of a unit, difficulty arises when
attempting to describe the casualties by element type. Since the advanced guard is
composed entirely of tanks and APCs with an average SUA of 25, the covering force
looses roughly twenty vehicles in this engagement. The battle between the main defense
and the main body for control of the built-up area lasts 17.6 hours. Again, this
represents a realistic figure for an urban engagement. While technically the time
represents continuous combat, as do all the times, the aggregation of the subactivities
comprising this one engagement make it difficult to attempt to describe the 17.6 hours
of activity as anything beyond an overall duration. Developing a higher resolution
network to model urban combat below the battalion level would allow this time to be
broken down into more detail.
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TABLE 9
SUMMARY OF BASE CASE CASUALTIES
FORCE NAME START CURRENT BREAKPOINT
SUA SUA
1 red. rag 719.9 719.9 0.0
2 red . r econ 233 .3 116.7 116.7
3 adv
.
guard 606.6 121.3 121.3
4 main . body 2733.1 1366.6 1366.6
5 ted . ft .hid 116.7 23.3 23.3
6 tin . mech .465.0 442 . 5 279.0
7 cover . force 465.0 442. 5 279.0
8 main . defense 1596.0 937 .0 186.0
9 flank .defense 991.6 873 .2 396.6
10 blue . reserve 213.3 213 . 3 0.0
3. Results
The Force Planning Model program outputs solution statistics. The statistics
for the base case are shown in Table 10. The activities along the critical path are given.
TABLE 10
SUMMARY OF BASE CASE SOLUTION STATISTICS
CRITICAL PATH IS ROW 16 OF PATH. ARC ARRAY WITH ARCS AS FOLLOWS
ARC NAME START
NODE
1 CF.MV.TO. ZONE 1
4 DEF .MV . TO . URBAN . AREA 2
12 MAIN. DEF .DEFEAT. MAIN. BDY 10







CRITICAL PATH IN SEQUENCE ORDER
DELAY IN THE COMPLETION OF ANY OF THESE ACTIVITIES
WILL DELAY THE COMPLETION OF THE MISSION
NAME OF ACTIVITY
CF.MV. TO. ZONE
DEF.MV. TO. URBAN. AREA
MAIN. DEF. PREP. ALT. PSNS
MAIN. DEF. DEFEAT. MAIN. BODY






The critical path for the urban defense mission reinforces what was expected. That is,
one would expect the critical activities to include as a minimum, moving the forces into
position on time and defeating the main assault on the built-up area. Note that the
slack times given for the activities are subject to interpretation. The literal meaning of
the slack time is the amount of time the activity can be delayed without affecting the
total completion time for the mission. When viewed in this respect, there is 10-14 hours
of slack for most of the activities not on the critical path. This type of information is
valuable to a planning staff faced with the many things that go wrong in a mission
once it begins.
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V. URBAN MODEL VALIDATION
The urban defense planning model easily accommodates the design concepts of
ALARM. An underlying motivation for simulations is the development of a means to
assist decision making. Thus, in this final chapter, the urban planning network is
isolated as a decision tool. Implementing the model for a few simple planning
decisions demonstrates its use in this role. A point repeated throughout this thesis is
recognition of those factors a commander controls that may influence the course of
battle. While recognizing a commander's ability to control or change factors in the real
world, the corresponding outcomes brought about by his choices remain uncertain
until implementation of the plan occurs. Using the urban network model and varying
the changeable factors, possible trade offs between options can be seen before hand.
Analyzing three planning situations demonstrates how the network model is used as a
decision tool. Within each situation, assume a single type of changeable factor
category is the basis for making a decision. By running the model at various input
values of the associated changeable factors, a means of analyzing activity completion
times and casualties results. Time is measured in hours and casualties are measured in
standard units of armament (SUAs). The casualty measurement is an aggregate SUA
value that cannot distinguish between the type of entities destroyed. Therefore, view
the values given as a relative loss in combat power rather than specific weapons
systems destroyed.
A. FIRST SITUATION
- The first case focuses at the brigade planning level. Suppose the brigade is
deciding how to assign artillery missions to its supporting artillery. Specifically, under
the current scenario, Task Force Lite has only its attached battery in direct support
(DS). This DS capability is improved upon by giving the task force priority of fires
from another battery. In terms of the model, doing so gives the task force an additional
battery's worth of SUAs. In actual terms, it doubles the number of tubes the task force
has in direct support. Therefore, the urban network program is changed to reflect the
increased SUA total and number of entities. The changeable factor varied is the
percentage of ammunition fired in the support mission. Assume the increased number of
artillery tubes doubles the available ammunition. The amount fired varies between
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percent and 100 percent. The results of this artillery mission assignment are contrasted
with the task force's performance with only its DS battery in support when firing
identical percentages of ammunition.
The time and casualty outcomes of two activities of the network are affected by
varying the percentage of ammunition fired against the enemy's attack formations.
Those activities affected are the fire support mission and the main defense's fight with
the main body within the urban area. In the first activity, the percentage of
ammunition fired determines the length of the fire mission. One expects that as the
duration of the fire mission increases, the friendly casualties from counterbattery fire
also increase. However, one also expects that the increased ordnance placed on the
enemy increases his attrition. Attriting the enemy force before it launches its assault
on the built-up area has obvious advantages for the defender. The time required to
defeat the attack should decrease as the size of the attacking force decreases. These
trade-offs can be analyzed by the network model.
The resulting activity time and casualties for selected values of the changeable
factor are shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The pie charts show the numbers resulting
Figure 5.1 Situation 1 Activity Times.
from each trial. The pie sections are coded to reflect whether the trial performed was
with priority of fires from an additional battery (PRI) or with the task force's direct
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support battery (DS) only. The number in parenthesis gives the value of the
changeable factor ( i.e., artillery mission allocation) used in each trial. For example,
consider the appropriate pie sections, of each activity, for the PRI(.3) and DS(.3) trials
in Figure 5.L Increasing the number of tubes available to the task force does not
significantly alter the time required to fire the mission. Each takes slightly over one
half hour (.571 hrs and .643 hrs, respectively). The main defense, however, defeats the
main body substantially faster (15.9 hrs to 23.8 hrs) when the task force can attrite the
enemy with more artillery support (given priority of fires) than with less. The figures
clearly demonstrate the trade-offs. Now consider the casualty diagrams in Figure 5.2
ENEUY WAIN SO-f CASUALTIES SUSTAINED FROM ARTY FRlENOLY CASUALTIES SUSTAINED N VIA ,N DEFENSE
Figure 5.2 Situation 1 Casualties Per Activity.
for the same two trials. They show that the enemy suffered 324 casualties when the
friendly forces had priority of fires from an additional battery but only 162 casualties
when the task force had just its DS battery in support. The corresponding losses to the
task force in the main defense activity are shown as 638 casualties when having priority
of fires. However, without priority of fires from an additional battery the friendly
casualties increase to 847 since the enemy cannot be attrittcd as much prior to his
attack occuring. Generally, the same effect is achieved with only a DS battery firing
the bulk of its ammunition as when the task force is given the additional fires of
another battery and uses only one-third of the ammunition available between the two
batteries.
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In terms of overall mission completion time and total friendly casualties
sustained, the effects of employing the various options are demonstrated by the bar
charts in Figure 5.3. Note, from the bar graph on the left, the nearly ten percent
increase of friendly casualties with only a DS battery firing one-third of its ammunition
(DS(.3)) than when the same percentage is fired from two batterys each, with one given
a priority of support mission to the task force (PRI(.3)). When reviewed from this
perspective, assigning the task force priority of fires significantly decreases the
percentage of casualties sustained in the operation. The total mission completion time
can also be reduced, as seen from the bar graph at the right, from 70.2 hours to 60.3
hours for the respective uses of artillery units and ammunition.
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Figure 5.3 Situation 1 Total Mission Times And Casualties.
B. SECOND SITUATION
In accordance with urban defensive doctrine, the task force organizes into a
covering force, flank security force, main defense force and a reserve. This organization
can be accomplished in a number of ways. Allocating the mechanized and armored
units to the covering force and flank security outside the built-up area is considered the
best use of these assets. However, the three light infantry companies can be allocated
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to either the main force within the built-up area, the Hank, security force on favorable
terrain, or the reserve. This situation analyzes the effects of varying the makeup of
these three forces based on use of the dismounted infantry. As in the base case, a
reserve of at least platoon strength is maintained and two full companies of infantry
defend from within Eiterfeld. Therefore, in this situation the issue is allocating the
platoons of the third infantry company. Assume the decision hinges upon the effects
various uses of the third company have on mission completion time and attrition to the
friendly force. Three activities are affected as a result of changing the disposition of
the third company: engaging the advanced guard on the flanks, fighting the assault on
the built-up area by the reconnaissance element, and defeating the main attack by the
enemy main body.
The pie charts at Figure 5.4 depfct the effects the various force configurations
have on the three activity completion times. Again, each pie section is coded in order
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Figure 5.4 Situation 2 Activity Times.
to distinguish the configurations used. The code reflects the fraction of the third
infantry company used on the flanks, as part of the reserve, and in the main defense.
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For example, the pie section a the three o'clock position shows 0F/.6R/.3M and
translates to using none of the platoons of the third company on the flanks, two
platoons (.6 or two out of three) in the reserve, and one platoon (.3 or one out of
three)in the main defense. Compare the results of this configuration with the results
when one platoon is shifted from the reserve and added to the main defense
(0F/.3R/.6M). The time required for the main defense to defeat the main body
decreases from 11.9 hours to 8.9 hours. Comparing the remaining sections of all the
pie charts charts in Figure 5.4 shows the effects on the three activity completion times
for the different uses of the third infantry company. Note the lack of significant
change to the length of the engagements with the recon element and advanced guard.
However, when the strength of the main force is increased by one or two additional
platoons the main body is defeated muph faster. The shortest times of 11.9 hours and
8.9 hours result from not using the infantry on the flank positions.
Adding infantry platoons to the main defense allows the enemy to be cleared
from the built-up area faster and results in fewer friendly casualties for this activity.
However, this means taking forces away from the flank positions and higher casualties
result to the friendly side when engaging the advanced guard. Compare the results in
Figure 5.5 for two alternative cases in which two out of the three platoons are
employed on the flanks with none in the the main defense (.6F/.3R/0M) and no
infantry platoons are placed on the flank but two are employed in the main defense
(0F/.3R/.6M). Little difference in friendly casualties is noted in the main defense fight
with the recon element because in both cases the size of the main defense overwhelms
the opposing force. However, not using any dismounted infantry on the flanks causes
the covering force to sustain 199 casualties against only 95.8 casualties if the two
platoons are positioned on the flanks. Additionally, the main defense sustains about
one-third more casualties when it is not augmented with the additional infantry
platoons.
The effects on overall mission completion time and total friendly casualties for
each employment option are given in Figure 5.6. The bar graph on the left indicates
that the mission concludes earlier with a strong main defense (0F/.6R/.3M), but
casualties are slightly less with a strong flank defense (.6F/.3R/0M). Casualties in all
cases are between 21 precent and 25 percent. Since casualties are in units of SUAs, the
difference is not particularly significant. It does emphasize the increased, intensity of
battle in an the urban environment and the better protection afforded dismounted
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MAIN DEFENSE vs MAIN 800Y
Figure 5.5 Situation 2 Casualties Per Activity.
troops on terrain adjacent to Eiterfeld where stand-off due to long range fires of the
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Figure 5.6 Situation 2 Total Mission Times and Casualties.
an enemy. Consequently, results point to these two courses of action as trade-off
points between time and casualties. The task force commander might select either one
depending upon other aspects of the mission and situation.
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C. THIRD SITUATION
The final situation for analysis is similar to the previous one in that it considers
the use of the battalion's organic anti-armor weapons. These weapons represent a
significant contribution to the light infantry's ability to defeat a mounted attack.
Therefore, how they are employed is critical to the defense plan. The mission and
terrain analysis should show that the most favorable locations for employing them is
on the key terrain adjacent to Eiterfeld or on the periphery of the built up area to
cover high speed avenues of approach to realize maximum use of their range. While
employing them on the flanks affords better range, occupying positions on the
outskirts of the built-up area may force the enemy to conduct a dismounted assault on
Eiterfeld. Assume that the positions are mutually exclusive; that is, the fires from each
do not overlap significantly. The TOW. (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
missiles) anti-tank weapons are therefore allocated between the two alternative
locations. This allocation affects the covering force's engagement with the advanced
guard (in its attempt to isolate the town) and the assault by the main body.
Ten options are considered that assume TOWs are used in pairs as tactics
commonly dictate. The pie diagrams in Figure 5.7 record the effects the various
COVERING FCRCE vs ADVANCED GUARD
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Figure 5.7 Situation 3 Activity Times.
options produce on activity completion times for the engagements against the
advanced guard and the main body. The pie section code indicates the number of
TOWs employed on the flanks and in the main defense. As an example, 18F/0M
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translates to all eighteen TOWs on the flanks and none positioned within the main
defense. Viewing counterclockwise around the figures shows the effects as more TOWs
are added to the main defense. Only in the case of the activity time required to defeat
the main body is a significant difference noted. The best option regards to time and the
main defense activity requires that the bulk of the anti-armor weapons be assigned to
the main defense positions on the edge of the built-up area (i.e., 2F/16M or the pie
section at the six o'clock position in the right diagram).
Again, utilizing the same type of diagrams of Figure 5.8 and considering friendly
casualties, one observes that casualties increase or decrease, for each of the two
affected activities, as the number of TOWs assigned to each sector increases or
decreases. The more TOWs available to the flank forces, the lower their casualties, as is
the case when more TOWs augment the* main defense force.
CCVERiNG FORCE vs ADVANCES GUARS WAIN DErENSE vS
VAiN aCOY
Figure 5.8 Situation 3 Casualties Per Activity.
From the perspective of the overall time and casualties on the mission, the ten
options are summarized by the bar graphs in Figure 5.9 that appear on the following
page. Option ten (allocating all of the TOWs to the main defense - 0F/18M) produces
the fewest casualties to the friendly force and a moderate reduction in mission
completion time. If minimizing time is an overiding consideration, then option seven
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BAR GRAPH CODE OPTION DEFINITION
OPT 1 18F/0M 18 to Flank - to Main
OPT 2 16F/2M 16 to Flank - 2 to Main
OPT 3 14F/4M 14 to Flank - 4 to Main
OPT 4 12F/6M 12 to Flank - 6 to Main
OPT 5 10F/8M 10 to Flank - 8 to Main
OPT 6 8F/10M 8 to Flank - 10 to Main
OPT 7 6F/12M 6 to Flank - 12 to Main
OPT 8 4F/14M 4 to Flank - 14 to Main
OPT 9 2F/16M 2 to Flank - 16 to Main
OPT 10 0F/18M to Flank - 18 to Main
Figure 5.9 Situation 3 Total Mission Times and Casualties.
To complete the discussion of the urban modeling research, the urban network is
put back into the context of ALARM and areas recommended for further study are
pointed out in the final chapter.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The objectives stated in the first chapter have been met by this research.
However, several ideas arise for further research in ALARM. Chapter II extended
contemporary terrain and transportation network methodology to better represent
planning operations in and around urban terrain. In addition, the effort was made, in
line with the third objective, to outline the linking of subordinate terrain networks
within a higher element's terrain network. The outline directs future efforts for
incorporating multi-echelon terrain and planning networks, generated by differing
missions, into the terrain and planning network of a higher command level responsible
for accomplishing each of these missions. The case-in-point would take the urban
defense and river defense, at the task force level, and link them to the brigade's sector
defense mission as presented in the scenario.
Within the scope of this research, additional research into a few areas will
enhance the realism of the model. These areas deal primarily with improving the
characteristic equations. Specifically, the duration equations for many of the non-
urban specific arcs are generalized. For example, preparing demolitions is simplified to
the point that it multiplies two aggregate factors together: the number of obstacles and
the average time to complete a typical obstacle. Structuring the activity into more
subtasks will enhance realism of the model. Tasks might include modeling movement of.
the engineer force between obstacles and the time spent preparing different types of
obstacles. Additionally, other changeable and immutable factors could be incorporated
that describe how preparation time is affected such as the size of the engineer force
doing the work and the number of obstacles by type. Any of the duration equations
can be enhanced by adding delays caused by hazards such as artillery fire, air
interdiction and minefields. The approach recommended suggests using the probability
distribution for a hazard occuring, multiplying the probability of occurance by the
expected cost in time, if it occurs, and summing this product with the duration
equation over all possible effects. A difficult problem caused by including hazard
delays in the duration equations is modeling the resulting attrition in the attrition
characteristic equations since in some instances this requires modeling attrition on
parallel activities something the Force Planning Model currently does not do.
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Finally, some of the attrition characteristic equations are adaptations of simple,
existing combat models. While the Lanchester models used are well founded, other
more complex forms exist such as stochastic models. Short of that level of complexity,
one can consider heterogeneous combat models and enhancements to the basic forms,
such as range dependency or battle termination with unit deterioration. Any of these
additions represent an improvement over the simpler forms used for this research. The
point is that this research has, in part, applied existing models by adapting them to the
scenario through assumptions, and obtained reasonable results. The emphasis,
however, was on demonstrating the applicability of the methodology and providing a
basis for later enhancements.
This thesis has improved the capability of ALARM to accurately represent urban
combat. At the same time it defines a mission for dismounted infantry forces in a
European environment that can be modeled and studied. The resolution of built-up
terrain is improved by identifying urban arc/node types and attributes and expanding
the standing list. Identifying seven additional arc types and and four node types allows
the use of key features of built-up areas in planning. The detailed study of urban
doctrine and tactics led to categorizing urban missions for light infantry forces and
developing a planning network that models a defensive mission. The resulting mission
template accommodates the design concepts of the ALARM planning process. Not
only is the network demonstrated as applicable for use in ALARM but it can be used
as a stand alone model for planning the defense of a built-up area. Lastly,this research
provides a well defined outline for a future direction of ALARM research, whereby




The following chart defines the battle responsibilities for various planning
organizations in accordance with Airland Battle Doctrine [Ref. 13].
CLOSE IN DEEP AOI
• Fights Divisions • Attacks • Receives
against first follow-on information

























































NOTE: AOI is Area of Interest.
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APPENDIX B
ARC AND NODE TYPES AND ATTRIBUTES
The following lists are arc and node types and attributes defined by previous
ALARiM research [Ref. 4: .]p. 68














Idem number of end node.
No. lanes on route
Off route class
Main route Class
Battle delay time of arc
Width of arc















URBAN DEFENSE INPUT PROGRAMS FOR THE FORCE PLANNING
MODEL
This appendix records the input files and programs to the Force Planning Model.
The notations in brackets {} are for cross reference to the text.
The following file is the Force Planning Model initialization file. (URBAN.INI).
The file gives the time requirement for the mission, the breakpoint values for the
conceptual forces, and the number of weapons assigned to each force. The file is
created in free format as a SIMSCRIPT (simulation script programming language) file.
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This SIMSCRIPT program is the data (URBAN.DAT) describing the urban
defensive planning network for the Force Planning Model simulation. In general, the
program lists types of weapons represented in the organic and conceptual forces and
gives their respective standard unit of armament value (SUA). Intrinsic functions

















listing of changeable and immutable factors with their respective values. The activities
comprising the network/planning template are listed in order of sequence with each
activity's characteristic equations defined. The final portion of the data file is a series of
constraint equations for checking that the sum of the fractional organic units used in
the conceptual forces equals one, that is, that the simulation uses all of the organic
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veh.int .025 .010 .050 .005 'CONVOY INTERVAL BETWEEN VEHICLES'
SPACING
march.int .005 .005 .020 .005 'ROAD MARCH INTERVAL BETWEEN PAX,KM.'
SPACING
form.int.mech .100 .050 .200 .050 'MOVEMENT TECHNIQUE INTERVAL FOR
MECH, KM'
SPACING
form.int.inf .025 .025 .100 .025 'MOVEMENT TECHNIQUE INTERVAL FOR
INFANTRY,KM'
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PLANNING.OPS {p. 43 and p. 57}
counter. attack.prep.time 6.0 6.0 12.0 1.0 TIME ALLOCATED TO PREPARE
FOR COUNTERATTACK, HRS'
LOGISTICS {p. 43 and p. 57}
tons.ammo.for spt 60 60 80 20 TONS OF AMMO FOR FIRE SUPPORT'
LOGISTICS {p. 57}
arty.mission.allocation .7 .3 .8 .1 AMMUNITION ALLOCATION IN TONS'
OBSTACLES {p. 43 and p. 57}
no.obstacles.to prep 2 2 2 2 OBSTACLES AND DEMOLITIONS PLANNED'
COVER.FORCE {p. 43}
fract.mech.cf 1.0 .3333 1.0 .3333 'FRACTION OF MECH IN COVERING FORCE'
COVER.FORCE
fract.arm.cf 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 "FRACTION OF ARMOR IN COVERING FORCE'
MAIN.DEFENSE {p. 43}
fract.mech.main 0.0 0.0 .3333 .3333 'FRACTION OF MECH IN MAIN DEFENSE'
MAIN.DEFENSE
fract.arm.main 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 'FRACTION OF ARMOR IN MAIN DEFENSE'
MAIN.DEFENSE
fract.aco.main 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 'FRACTION OF COMPANY A IN MAIN DEFENSE'
MAIN.DEFENSE
fract.bco.main 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 'FRACTION OF COMPANY B IN MAIN DEFENSE'
MAIN.DEFENSE
fract.cco.main 0.0 0.0 1.0 .3333 'FRACTION OF COMPANY C IN MAIN
DEFENSE' {p. 69}
MAIN.DEFENSE
fract.at.main .4444 0.0 .8888 .2222 'FRACTION OF AT ASSETS MAIN DEFENSE'
MAIN.DEFENSE
fract.btn-d.main 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 'FRACTION OF BATTERY D IN MAIN DEFENSE'
MAIN.DEFENSE
fract.engr.main 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 'FRACTION OF ENGINEERS IN MAIN DEFENSE'
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FLANK.DEFENSE {p. 43}
fract.mech.flank 0.0 0.0 .6666 .3333 'FRACTION OF MECH SECURING FLANKS'
FLANK.DEFENSE
fract.arm.flank 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 'FRACTION OF ARMOR SECURING FLANKS'
FLANK.DEFENSE
fract.cco.flank .6666 0.0 1.0 .3333 'FRACTION COMPANY C SECURING
FLANKS' {p. 69}
FLANK.DEFENSE
fract.at.flank .5554 0.0 1.0 .1111 'FRACTION AT ASSETS ON FLANKS'
BLUE.RESERVE
fract.cco.blue.reserve .3333 0.0 1.0 .3333 'FRACTION CO C IN RESERVE' {p. 69}
48
distl2 50 30 10 {p. 45}
distl3 15 7 5
dist24 20 5 3
dist 67 5 3 3
veh.road.speed 15 25 30
veh.xcountry.speed 5 5 10
technique.factor.m .8 .8 .8
pax.road.speed 2 3 5
pax.xcountry. speed 1 2 3
technique, factor.i 1 1 1
towed.veh.length .015 .015 .015
vehicle.length .0075 .0075 .0075
no.veh.per.form 6 6 6
no.pax.per.form 160 160 160
no.cf.form 4 3 1
no.main. def.form 3 3 3
form.angle 1.047 1.047 1.04-7
arty.casualties.(sua).per.ton.fired 7.0 9.0 16.0 {p. 45}
alpha.df 1.8 1.8 1.8 {p.57}
alpha.idf.3 .3 .3
alpha.urban 1.5 1.5 1.5
beta.df .9 .9 .9
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beta.idf .4 .4 .4
beta.urban .6 .6 .6
time. to. occupy. arty .33 .2 .11 (p. 46}
prob.cbtry.det .2 .05 .01
prob.cbtry.hit .3 .1 .05
built.up.area.vol 5.09 2.57 .041
per.cent.urban .5 .25 .2
blue.clear.rate .24 .48 .96 {p. 58}
per.cent.defended .3 .1 .05
obstacle.prep.time 4.0 2.5 1.5
time.per.psn.per.total.unit .3 .15 .1
number.alt.sup.psn 36 18 9
defense.factor 1.4 2.0 3.0
fract.red.recon.recon 1.0 .6666 .3333 {p. 46}
fract.red.tank.bn.recon .1111 .1111 .1111
fract.red.bnl.recon .1111 .1111 .1111
fract.rag.ag .3333 .3333 .3333
fract.red.tank.bn.ag .3333 .3333 .3333
fract.red.recon.ag 0.0 .3333 .6666
fract.red.bn2.mb 1.0 1.0 1.0
fract.red.bn3.mb 1.0 1.0 1.0
fract.red.tank.bn.mb .6666 .6666 .6666
tract.rag.mb .6666 .6666 .6666
fract.red.bnl.mb .6666 .6666 .6666
23
aco 2 fract.aco.mam *STOP*
bco 2 fract.bco.main *STOP*
ceo 2 fract.cco.main fract.cco.flank.fract.cco.blue.reserve *STOP*
btryd 2 fract.btryd.main *STOP*
mech 2 fract.mech.cf fract.mech.main fract.mech.flank *STOP*
arm 2 fract.arm.cf fract.arm.main fract.arm.cf *STOP*
at 2 fract.at.flank fract.at.main *STOP*

















2 fract.mech.cf fract.mech.flank fract.mech.main fract.arm.cf
fract.arm.flank fract. arm.main *STOP*
2 fract.mech.cf fract.arm.cf *STOP*
2 fract.mech.main fract.arm.main fract.aco.main fract. bco.main
fract.cco.main fract. at.main fract.engr.main
fract.btryd.main *STOP*
2 fract.mech.flank fract.arm.flank fract. ceo. flank
fract.at.flank *STOP*






1 CF.MV.TO.ZONE 1 2 red.recon cover.force
no.cf.form 1.0 SUBT form.int.mech * no.veh.per.form .5 * 1.0 veh.int * form.angle SIN
* PLUS no.cf.form * dist 1 2 PLUS veh.xcountry. speed technique.factor.m * / *STOP*
{eqn. 3.8}
fract.red.recon.recon SUA(recon) * fract.red.tank.bn.recon SUA(tank.bn) * PLUS
*STOP*{eqn. 3.13}
SUA(red.recon) *STOP*
fract.mech.cf SUA(mech) * fract.arm.cf SUA(arm) * PLUS *STOP*
SUA(cover. force) *STOP*
2 ARTY.MOVE.TO.FIRE.PSN I 3 red.rag btryd
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vehicle.length veh.int PLUS VEH(btryd) * veh.int SUBT distl3 PLUS veh.road.speed /
*STOP* {eqn. 3.7}
fract.rag.ag SUA(red.rag) *fract.rag.mb SUA(red.rag) * PLUS *STOP*
SUA(red.rag) *STOP*
fract.btryd.main SUA(btryd) * *STOP*
SUA(btryd) *STOP*




fract.btryd.main SUA(btryd) * fract.aco.main SUA(aco) * PLUS fract.bco.main
SUA(bco) * PLUS fract.cco.main SUA(cco) * PLUS fract.at.main SUA(at) * PLUS
fract.engr.main SUA(engr) * PLUS fract.mech.main SUA(mech) * PLUS
fract.arm.main SUA(arm) * PLUS *STOP*
SUA(main.defense) *STOP*
4 DEF.MV.TO.URBAN.AREA 2 4 red.rag main.defense
no.main.def.form 1.0 SUBT form.int.inf * no.pax.per.form .5 * 1.0 SUBT march.int *
form.angle SIN * PLUS no.main.def.form * dist24 PLUS pax.xcountry.speed


















7 CF.FIGHT.RED.RECON 5 6 red.recon cover.force
1.0 alpha.df beta.df * SQRT / ORG(red.recon) ORG( cover. force) / MINUS
BRK(red.recon) * alpha.df beta.df / ORG(red.recon) ORG(red.recon) *
ORG( cover. force) ORG(cover.force) * / 1.0 BRK(red.recon) BRK(red.recon) * SUBT *
SUBT SQRT PLUS alpha.df beta.df / SQRT ORG(red.recon) ORG(cover.force) /
SUBT / LOG. 10 * *STOP* {eqn. 3.9}
SUA(red.recon)
BRK(red.recon) ORG(red.recon) * *STOP*
SUA(cover.force) *STOP*
1.0 beta.df alpha.df / ORG( red.recon) ORG(cover.force) / ORG( red.recon)
ORG(cover.force) / * * 1.0 BRK(red.recon) BRK(red.recon) * SUBT * SUBT SQRT
ORG( cover.force) * *STOP* {eqn. 3.14}
8 CF.MOVE.TO.FLANK 6 7 red.recon cover.force
no.cf.form 1.0 SUBT form.int.mech * VEH(cover.force) no.cf.form / .5 * 1.0 SUBT
veh.int * form.angle SIN * PLUS no.cf.form * dist67 PLUS veh.xcountry. speed






9 MAIN.DEFENSE.FIGHT.RED.RECON 7 8 red.ft.hld main.defense
BRK(red.ft.hld) 1.0 SUBT 0.4 * alpha.df MINUS / SUA(main.defense) /
BRK(red.ft.hld) 1.0 SUBT 0.6 * SUA(red.recon) * alpha.idf MINUS /
SUA(main.defense) / PLUS *STOP* {eqn. 3.11}
SUA(red.recon) *STOP*
BRK(red.ft.hld) SUA(red.recon) * *STOP*
SUA(main.defense) *STOP*
1.0 beta.urban alpha.urban / SUA(red.ft.hld) SUA(main.defense) / SUA(red.ft.hld)
SUA(main.defense) / * * 1.0 BRK(red.ft.hld) BRK(red.ft.hld) * SUBT * SUBT SQRT
SUA(main.defense) * *STOP*
10 CF.DEFEAT.ADV.GUARD 8 9 adv.guard flank.defense
1.0 alpha.df beta.df * SQRT / ORG(adv.guard) ORG( flank.defense) / MINUS
BRK(adv.guard) * alpha.df beta.df / ORG(adv.guard) ORG(adv.guard) *
ORG(flank.defense) ORG( flank.defense) * / 1.0 BRK(adv.guard) BRK(adv.guard) *
SUBT * SUBT SQRT PLUS alpha.df beta.df / SQRT ORG(adv.guard)
ORG( flank.defense) / SUBT / LOG. 10 * *STOP*
fract.rag.ag SUA(red.rag) * fract.red.tank.bn.ag SUA(tank.bn) * PLUS
fracr.red.recon.ag SUA(red.recon) * PLUS *STOP*
BRK(adv.guard) ORG( adv.guard) * *STOP*
SUA(cover.force) fract.cco.flank SUA(cco) * PLUS fract.at.flank SUA(at) * PLUS
*STOP*
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1.0 beta.df alpha.df / ORG(adv.guard) ORG(flank.defense) / ORG(adv.guard)
ORG(flank.defense) / * * 1.0 BRK(adv.guard) BRK(adv.guard) * SUBT * SUBT SQRT
ORG(flank.defense) * *STOP*
11 ARTY.FIRE.SPT 9 10 main.body btryd
tons.ammo.for.spt tons.per.tube.(sua).per.hour SUA(btryd) * / arty.mission.allocation *
STOP*
fract.rag.mb SUA(red.rag) * fract.red.bn2.mb SUA(bn2) * PLUS fract.red.bn3.mb
SAU(bn3) * PLUS fract.red.tank.bn.mb SUA(tank.bn) * PLUS fract.red.bnl.mb
SUA(bnl) * PLUS *STOP*
SUA( main,body) arty. casualties.(sua). per.ton.fired tons.ammo.for.spt
arty.mission.allocation * SUBT *STOP* {eqn. 3.15}
SUA(btryd) *STOP«
SUA(btryd) beta.idf DURATION * prob.cbtry.det * prob.cbtry.hit * SUA(btryd) *
SUBT*STOP* {eqn. 3.16}
12 MAIN.DEF.DEFEAT.MAIN.BODY 10 11 main.body main.defense
built.up. area.vol per.cent.urban * blue.clear.rate / per. cent.defended * SUA(main.body)
SUA(main.defense) defense.factor * / * EXP *STOP* (eqn. 3.12}
SUA(main.body) *STOP*
SUA(main.body) ORG(main.body) * *STOP*
SUA(main.defense) *STOP*
1.0 beta.urban alpha.urban / SUA(main.body) SUA(main.defense) / SUA(main.body)
SUA(main.defense) / * * 1,0 BRK(main.body) BRK(main.body) * SUBT * SUBT
SQRT SUA(main.defense) * *STOP*
13 PREP.DEMO 4 9 red.rag eng




fract.eng.main SUA(eng) * *STOP*
SUA(eng) *STOP*
14 MAIN.DEF.PREP.ALT.PSNS 4 10 red.rag blue.reserve time.per.psn.per.total.unit
number.alt.sup.psn * 1.0 fract.cco. blue.reserve / * *STOP*
SUA(red.rag) *STOP*
SUA(red.rag) *STOP*
fract.cco.blue.reserve SUA(cco) * *STOP*
SUA(blue.reserve) *STOP*




SUA(cover. force) SUA( blue.reserve) PLUS *STOP*
SUA( cover. force) SUA(cco) PLUS *STOP*
1 12
26
fract.mech.cf *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.arm.cf *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.mech.main *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.arm.main *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.cco.main *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.at.main *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.eng.main *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.mech.flank *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.arm.flank *STOP* > = *STOP*
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fract.cco.flank *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.eng. flank *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.cco.blue.reserve *STOP* > = *STOP*
fract.mech.cf fract.mech.main PLUS fract.mech.flank PLUS *STOP* < = 1.0 *STOP*
fract.arm.cffract.arm.main PLUS fract.arm.flank PLUS *STOP* < = 1.0 *STOP*
fract.aco.main *STOP* < = 1.0 *STOP*
fract.bco.main *STOP* < = 1.0 *STOP*
fract. ceo.main fract.cco.flank PLUS fract.cco.blue.reserve PLUS *STOP* < = 1.0
*STOP*
fract.at.main fract.at.flank PLUS *STOP* < - 1.0 *STOP*
fract. btryd.main *STOP* < = 1.0 *STOP*
fract.engr.main *STOP* < = 1.0 *STOP*
tons.ammo.for.spt *STOP* < = *STOP*
fract.mech.cf fract.mech.nank PLUS fract.mech.main PLUS *STOP* > =.98 *STOP*
fract.arm.cf fract.arm.flank PLUS fract.arm.main *STOP* > = .98 *STOP*
fract.aco.main *STOP* > = .98 *STOP*
fract.bco.main *STOP* > = .98 *STOP*
fract. ceo.main fract.cco.flank PLUS fract.cco.blue.reserve PLUS *STOP* > = .98
*STOP*
fract.at.main fract.at.flank *STOP* > = .98 *STOP*
fract. btryd.main *STOP* > = .98 *STOP*
fract.eng.main *STOP* > = .98 *STOP*
91
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Washington D.C.,
May 1986.
2. Rolands and Associates Model, The Force Planning Model, Monterey, California,
July 1984.
3. Choi, Seok. Cheol, Determination of Network Attributes From High Resolution
Terrain Data, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
September 1987.
4. Mclaughlin, Joseph R., The Extension Of Unit Allocation and Countermobility
Planning Algorithms in the Airland Advanced Research Model, M.S. Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1986.
5. Department of the Army Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized
Terrain (MOUT), Washington D.C., August 1979.
6. Department of the Army, U.S. Army TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity,
TRASANA-TR-63-82, American Canadian Australian British Urban Game
(ACABUG) Urban Terrain Classification System, November 1983.
7. Rolands and Associates Data File, Map M745 3-DMG-1975, Monterey,
California, July 1987.
8. Parry, Samual H., Preliminary Conceptual Design for the Airland Advanced
Research Model {ALARM), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
August 1986.
9. Manzo, Joseph J. and James M. Hughes, A Surrogate for Soviet Division Level
Automated Troop Control Systems, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, June 1984.
10. Taylor, James G., Lanchester Type Models of Warfare, Vol. I, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1984.
11. The Combined Arms Services and Staff College Text CML 84-7168, Soviet Army
Equipment, Organization and Operations Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, March 1984.
92
12. Ft. Benning Special Text 23-90-292, Platoon Weapons Handbook, Ft. Benning,
Georgia, May 1978.
13. The Combined Arms Services and Staff College Text CML 84-7167, Tactics




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002




U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center
White Sands Missile Range, NM 88002
5. Commander 3
U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center
Attn: Mr. Reed Davis
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
6. Director 1
Attn: Mr. E.B. Vandiver III
U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency
Bethesda, MD 20814
7. Bell Hall Library 1
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027
8. Dr. Samual H. Parry Code 55Py 5
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943





Attn: COL Tony Brinkley
Studies and Analysis Directorate
Headquarters, U.S. Army TRADOC
Fort Monroe, VA 23651
94
11. Department of Operations Research
Attn: MAJ Dan Reyen
AFIT/ENS
Wright Patterson AFB, OH 45433
12. Director
U.S. Army Models Management Office
Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
13. Captain Christopher S. Pritchett
Route 1, Box 153-E
Alexander, AK 72002
95
V\
ikf>


Thesis
P944167
c.l
P
'^tek.
Pritchett
A methodology for
modeling urban combat
in ALARM.
%bat
Thesis
P944167
e, 1
Pritchett
A methodology for
modeling urban combat
in ALARM.

